Grain embargoes: criteria for success and failure by Sazdanoff, Donald Louis
Retrospective Theses and Dissertations Iowa State University Capstones, Theses andDissertations
1985
Grain embargoes: criteria for success and failure
Donald Louis Sazdanoff
Iowa State University
Follow this and additional works at: https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/rtd
Part of the Agricultural and Resource Economics Commons, Agricultural Economics Commons,
and the International Economics Commons
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Iowa State University Capstones, Theses and Dissertations at Iowa State University Digital
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Retrospective Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Iowa State University Digital
Repository. For more information, please contact digirep@iastate.edu.
Recommended Citation
Sazdanoff, Donald Louis, "Grain embargoes: criteria for success and failure" (1985). Retrospective Theses and Dissertations. 17108.
https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/rtd/17108
Grain embargoes -- criteria f or success and failure 
f.5tf _ 
/ ?ff'? 
5a ?7 
c. 3 
by 
Donald Louis Sazdanoff 
A Thesis Submitted to the 
Gr aduat e Faculty in Partial Fulfillment of the 
Requirements fo r the Degree of 
MASTER OF SCIENCE 
Depar t ment : Economics 
Maj o r: Agricultu ral Economics 
Signatures have been redacted for privacy 
Iowa State University 
Ames, Iowa 
1985 
ll 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
CHAPTER I . INTRODUCTION 
CHAPTER II. ALTERNATIVE PARADIGMS 
CHAPTER III. AGRICULTURAL PHILOSOPHY OF THE UNITED STATES 
AND THE SOVIET UNION 
CHAPTER IV. UNITED STATES - SOVIET UNION GRAIN TRADE AND 
AGREEMENTS 
CHAPTER V. THE STRUCTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL GRAIN MARKETING 
SYSTEM 
CHAPTER Vl. THE GRAIN EMBARGOES 
CHAPTER VII. CONCLUSION 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
APPENDIX . HOLDINGS OF MULTINATIONAL GRAIN FIRMS 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
l 
11 
24 
54 
67 
92 
112 
132 
l37 
149 
l 
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
" . .. the stud y of in t er national political economy has been 
neglec t ed . Politics and economi cs hav e been divo r ced from each 
other and isolated in the analysis and theory, i f not in the 
r eal ity , of international r elations" (Sper o 1981, p. 1) . 
Th is separation occurred with the evolution o f mod e rn Western academe 
and its liberalism. The liberal thinking of theo r is t s separated 
international political economics in t o a dichotomized orde r. One reason 
for doing so , they argued, was that an economic sys t em cons i s ting of the 
production, distribution , a nd consumption of goods and services operated 
und er natur a l l aws . These natural laws could onl y func t ion under the 
privat e ent e r prise system away from the confines of political involvement . 
This is because gove r nment ope r a t es under a system of power , influence, and 
public decision-making, which is not a conduit to the harmon y necessar y fo r 
the na tural laws of economics to opera t e . Thus, they fel t i t only natur al 
fo r the two to be looked at as the se parat e entities of international 
poli t ics and international economics . Thi s, of course , has lead to 
theorists ofttimes ignoring the fact that the two cover common gro und 
(Spero 1981, p . 2) . This has become es peciall y eviden t during the pas t 
decade as i nt ernat i onal politics and economics have become linked in terms 
of relations bet ween Deve l oped and Developing nations; the United States, 
the European Economic Community, and Japan; and East and West , mor e 
specifi call y, between the United Stat es and the Sovie t Union. This is 
especia l ly true when dealing with such basic commodities as food and feed 
grains. Through policy actions, this link can be mani pulated, unde r 
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certain circums tances , by the Pr esident to improve a domestic political 
si tuation and/or an international political situation. 
The principal problem of fo r eign political and economic pol icy, 
including the t o pic of this s tudy - foreign ag ricul tural policy - is the 
need t o balance domestic and international considerations. Although a 
decision will have ramificat i on s in both arenas, they will no t necessaril y 
be given equal weights. These decisions will enta il 
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• • • government actions with important impact[s] on U.S . relations 
with other governme nt s and on the pr od uction and distribution of 
good s and services at home and ab r oad" (Destler 1980, p. 7). 
Three situations when the President is likely to consider the 
manipulation of agricultural po licy are: 1) when there is a disruption i n 
the domestic economy , such as a s hort supply of g r ain , wh ich can have both 
international po litical and economic e ffects, espec ially if the President 
employs an embargo t o keep the grain within the United St ates; 2) when the 
international arena is d isrupt ed and there can be rami fication s in the 
domestic arena if the President embargoes a nation to protest actions t aken 
by that nation; a nd 3) when the Pres i dent uses foreign agricultur al policy 
to improve both domestic and i nt ernat ional r elation s , such as by 
negotiating g ra in agreements with fo r eign nations to build good will and a t 
the s ame time alleviate l a rge domes tic supplies which may be holding down 
farm prices . 
The increased importance of foreign agricul tural policy within the 
last decade has been influenced b y the increase in demand by foreign 
coun tr ies fo r Ame r ican g r ain. In 1960, demand from abroad re s ulted i n $4 .8 
billion worth of ag ricultur al expor ts and a $1 b ill ion s ur pl us in th e 
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balance of payments for the United States . At that time , this figure 
resulted in 44% of the world trade , which totalled sixty- six million metric 
tons . By 1980 the dollar amount had increased to $40 billion or 58% of 
world t r ade, which was approaching two hundred mill ion metric tons . This 
increased the agricultural balance of payments t o a $20 billion surplus 
(Hathaway 1981 , p. 7). 
This increase in demand is a consequence of four major factors. The 
first is a major increase in the growth of the world economy outside of the 
United States, especially in Western Europe and Japan. The second is the 
increase in population in the developing countries. The third is the 
failure of communist centrally planned economies to meet production goals 
in agriculture . The fourth is detente, which has lead to expanding trade 
with the Soviet Union, the Eastern Bloc, and the Peoples Republic of Ch i na . 
Two other factors which have been instrumental, but to a lesser degree, 
wer e the maintenance of United States price supports at or below world 
prices; and the devaluation of the dollar and the abolition of fixed 
e xchange rate system which over-valued the dollar and over-pr iced American 
agricultural commod ities . 
These changes have brought about c hanges in politics and policy 
making. It has redef ined the power structure within private farm groups 
and within the Executive branch of gove rnment. This redefining of 
s tructure has made it easier for these two actors t o influence Congress , 
which has also undergone changes . All three of these groups are, of 
cour se , instrumental in making agricultural policy. 
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Private farm groups 
As the family farm became more specialized , the producer representa-
tives which they sent to Washington did also . Previously, producers 
depended, to a certain extent, on general farm organizations for lobbying, 
but this is no l onger true. These r epr esentatives now lobby for policies 
which influence specific commodities. Two other forces which have arisen 
are the farmer cooperatives and the agribusiness-exporters. These three 
gro ups lobby for policies which call for moderate price supports, high 
export levels, and full production of g r ain . 
Congress 
There have been changes in Congress also but not necessarily as a 
result of the restructuring which has occurred in agriculture . However, 
this does not lessen the influence these changes have on agricultural 
pol icy making. 
First of all, there has been a decline in the average tenure of 
members in both houses . Of the forty-seven members of the House 
Agriculture Committee, l ess than one-third of those who wrote the 1977 Farm 
Bill had ever written a farm bill before. This was equally true of the 
1981 Farm Bill. This has been primarily caused by the landslide 
presidential victories of 1964, 1972, and 1980 (Hathaway 1981, p . 11). 
The second change has bee n the influence of specialized producer 
r epresentatives on these new members . These representatives exploit the 
inexperience of these new members to influence passage of programs that 
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subsidize industries which can result in surplus production. Two such 
programs presently favor the dairy and peanut industries. 
However , two controls have evolved which can, to a n extent, coun teract 
these changes . The first is the amendment process which programs and 
policy must now go through; the second is the limits which the newly 
created budget committees can place on programs. These two controls lead 
to compr omise and bargaining within Congress when deciding agricultural 
policy (Hathaway 1981, p . 12). 
Executive Branch 
This change in the complexion of American agriculture has also brought 
about changes in politics and policy making within the Executive branch. 
There have been power shifts between the Department of Agricu l ture and 
other agencies. Because of the increasing importance and complexities of 
agr icul tural trade, there has been more involvement from outside agencies, 
namely the State Department, Treasury, the United States Trade 
Representative, the National Security Council, the Council of Economic 
Advisors, and the Office of Management and Budget. Before this change , 
policy decisions were only shared with the latter two agencies and the 
U.S . D. A. The inclusion of these agencies has caused more decisions to come 
from the White House. This mean s that recommendations and decisions are 
being made by persons who may have less of an understanding of the 
agricultural situation than before but more understanding of international 
relations and of linkage between United Sta te s agriculture and the r es t of 
the United States economy and o ther economies. This is especially true 
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since the agricultural sector is being used as a tool in other 
considerations, e.g., foreign policy (this has caused rifts between the 
Secretaries of Agriculture and State). 
Using this sector as a foreign policy tool has upset farm groups , 
since they have at times been hurt by policy decisions . Previously, farm 
groups had access t o the USDA ' s policy makers, and could influence policy. 
Now that influence has diminished with the influx of these other decision-
making bodies . The USDA's role has been reduced to that of an arbitrator 
or intermed iary between farm g roups and the o ther executive agencies and is 
consequently blamed by both groups for agricultural problems . 
Implementing agricultural policy within the Executive Branch r equires 
coordinat ion which involves two areas. The first is managing the polic y 
decision processes. Before making a decision, the President and his senior 
advisors, should recognize and analyze all of the alternative policy 
interests and goals. Secondly, after the President makes a decision, the 
official actions which r esult should be overseen to insure that the goal s 
set are accomplished (Destler 1980, p. 8). 
Since Eisenhower, each successive administration has attempted to 
coordinate policy by forming interagency advisory groups and delegating 
responsibility differently t o c abinet secretaries and advisors . 
These three groups of actors all have an influence in deciding 
agricultural policy to different degrees . They use a bargaining process in 
order to obtain a policy favorable to them. This difference in policy 
choice results in confl ict whose outcome is de termined b y power. This 
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means, of course, that the proportion of policy favorable to a particular 
group is related to the amount of perceived power it wields at that time. 
Congress, with its power to levy tariffs and regulate foreign com-
. . . . . . ' merce given under the Constitution, tries to protect its constituents 
vested interests. Special-interest groups also try to influence Congress 
for their constituents through lobbying. As stated before, the President 
may link agricultural policy to foreign policy, foreign economic goals, and 
domestic considerations. Thus, policy implementation and management is 
difficult, because it takes into account many different actors and groups . 
This brings one to the question of how decision makers, most notably the 
President, decide agricultural foreign policy? 
Several conceptual paradigms have been developed to try and answer the 
question of how foreign policy is decided. 
The first theorist was Graham Allison, who developed a paradigm that 
was known as the Rational Actor Model . This model was the result of a 
study Allison did on the Cuban missile crises. Unfortunately, the paradigm 
he developed did not offer an adequate solution and consequently was 
revised by Allison and several other theorists into the Enlarged 
Bureaucratic Politics Model. This also was not an adequate model . Whereas 
the Rational Actor Model was too narrow in scope, the Enlarged Bureaucratic 
Politics Model was too wide. Hence, it was divided into five more precise 
analytic paradigms known as the Bureaucratic Politics Model, the 
Organizational Process Model, the Electoral Politics Model, the Shared 
Values Model, and the Personal Values Model. Another model which was 
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devel oped, but not as an outcome of Allison ' s original work, was the 
Groupthink Model by Irving Janis. 
William T . Weber tested these models by comparing their usefulness in 
explaining United States agricultural foreign policy choices . His study 
begins with the Eisenhower Adminis tration and extends through the Nixon-
Ford years. Weber concluded that the Electoral Politics Model was the most 
useful model in explaining agricultural fo r eign policy decision making. 
Joan Spero , in her study of the pol i tics of int ernational economic 
r e lations, agrees in part with Weber that e lector al considerations 
influence policy decisions. Spero says, 
"Very often , what shape s the political bargaining process are 
overriding strategic and diplomatic interests . Economic policy 
is fr e quently either shaped by political concerns or becomes an 
explicit tool of national s trategic and dipl omatic policy. Trade 
policy is frequentl y consc io us l y linked with polit ic al goals" 
(Spero 1981, p. 9) . 
This present thesis will attempt t o narrow the s tud y of how the Presiden t 
decides agricultural f or eign policy one step further by s tud ying t hree of 
the grain embargoes which have occurr ed ove r the pas t decade . Those 
embargoes occurred in June of 1973 on soybean export s , in August of 1975 on 
g rain exports, and in January of 1980 aga in on gra in export s . Although al l 
of these embargoes we r e initiated in response to actions taken by the 
Soviet Union , onl y the latte r t wo wer e directed specific all y at that nation 
and in the second instance also at its satellite nation, Po land . 
The purpose o f thi s thesis will be to de t e rmine if the El ectora l 
Politics Mod e l, which will be explained in the next chapt e r, can be used to 
explain the decision-making process which i ni tia t ed these emb a rgoes . There 
9 
There are two objectives for this. 1) By using the three embargoes, find 
the conditions for success and failure, so that a gener alized list may be 
made to compar e and cont rast with fu t ur e possible embar goes . Conditions 
may be eclecticall y chosen f r om the generalized list which would r esult in 
the highest pr obability of success when applied to a future embargo after 
the situation surrounding the pending embargo has been studied . 2) to 
determine the strengths and weaknesses of this model once the conditions 
are discover ed, and, if possible, to suggest what this model fails to 
explain in terms of the decision- making pr ocess . 
These objectives were chosen because they may provide reasons why past 
embargoes may or may not have served their purpose, and, if not , why not? 
In other wo r ds, were some of the conditions, which may have increased the 
pr obabili t y of success, missing or ignored? And also, can future embargoes 
b e mad e more effective by analyzing past ones? 
Of course, no t only must the embargoes be analyzed, but other areas as 
we l l, to give the essential background material and refer ences necessary to 
clarify why certain actions were taken if they were at all, or what actions 
shou l d have been taken if they wer e not . These areas involve an analysis 
of the agricul tural philosophy of both t he United States and the Soviet 
Union, an explanation of the reasoning behind the grain agreements, and a 
description of the international grain marketing system and the role of the 
mul tinational gr ain firms . The last ar ea studied will be an analysis of 
the embar goes and the lis t of conditions which would pr ovide the highest 
probability of success. 
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However, before doing so, it will be necessary to explain the 
paradigms being used and the origins of each . These will be examined in 
the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER II . ALTERNATIVE PARADIGMS 
Before beginning the explanation of the alternative paradigms, it is 
necessary to know that the primary source used for this chapter was a work 
done by William T. Weber to fulfill the requirements for a Doctorate at the 
University of Virginia in 1977. The purpose of his research was to 
" . .. test the internal consistency, validity and applicability of the 
various conceptual frameworks now being used to study the American foreign 
policy process" (Weber 1977, pp. 12-13). He tested these paradigms against 
past American agricultural export policies from the Eisenhower 
Administration through of the Nixon-Ford yea r s . Agr iculturai exports 
include food aid, concessional sales , and commercial sales. This t opic was 
chosen because of the high degree of government involvement necessary as 
c ompared to trade in other goods. 
Therefore, for the sake of s implification, Weber ' s work will only be 
r eferenc ed when directly quoted. 
The first model that attempted to exp lain the decision-making process 
was Graham Allison's Rational Ac tor Model . This wa s a simplified model 
which assumed all decision makers to be alike, weighing cos ts and benefits 
to make rational choices. However, Allison and other theorists decided 
that the Rational Acto r Mod e l did not offer a feasible solution because of 
three fundamental faults inherent in the model. These faults were : 1) it 
assumed the existence of a sole unitary decision maker; 2) decisions were 
based on economic criteria which are not necessaril y acceptable or superior 
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when making political choices; and 3) it assumed a decision would be made 
in an absolute r ational manner to obtain a global maximum. 
Allison and several other theorists revised this model by editing 
several of the old concept s and adding , most notably, the concepts of 
persuasion and bargaining . After these r evisions, the Rational Actor Model 
became known as the enlar ged Bureaucratic Politics Model. Unfort unately, 
this model also did not offer a feasible solution. It focused on too man y 
variables which often led to too many , and often contradictory, hypotheses. 
Thus, it was not a manageable paradigm that could be used to easily ca t e-
gorize the policy process . Again, revisions were made after many contribu-
tions of thought by theorists until the original enlar ged Bureaucratic 
Politics Model was finally divided into five anal ytic paradigms which could 
more easily explain the policy process. These paradigms are "based on 
different answers to the question: Whe r e do participants in the foreign 
policy process receive their primary clues for defining the national 
interest?" (Weber 1977, p. 56) . There are five principal sources for these 
c lues. They result from: l) the paroch ial perception and concerns of the 
Executiv e branch; 2) the routines and standard operating procedures of 
gove rnmental organizat ions; 3) public officials ' electoral concer ns; 
4) societies ' shar ed values and historical memories, and 5) an individual ' s 
personal experiences , interes ts, and memory of history . The fiv e paradigms 
fo rmulated were: 1) the Bureaucratic Politics Model; 2) the Organizational 
Process Model; 3) the El ectoral Politics Model; 4) the Shared Values Model; 
and 5) the Personal Values Model. 
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All of these paradigms use a different unit of analysis when l ooking at 
the policy process. By the same token, each model is not an entit y unto 
itself but may contain certain elements common to other models. Also, 
bec ause the policy process is so complex, with the numerous elements and 
circumstances involved, no single model can fully explain a given situation 
or policy stance. This, however, is not their purpose . Each individual 
model focuses only on certain elements of the policy processes in or der to 
suggest hypotheses about the way the process works . To make the policy 
process manageable, several models must be incorporated, each looking at 
different angles of the process. 
Bureaucratic Politics Model 
The Bureaucratic Politics Model has as its unit of analysis 
governmental action resulting from politics within the executive branch . 
The policy stance a particular individual takes will depend on his position 
within the branch. 
Included in this model are the concepts of o r ganizat i onal alliances and 
parochial perceptions . Government is defined as a loose alliance of 
o r ganizations that try to seek consensus with other groups in order to 
achieve goal s . Consensus is reached as a r esult of bar gaining and 
compromising . Compromising is a tactic where an agreement is reached by 
exchanging, or pretending to exchange, concession s over a fixed area of 
discussion. Bargaining occurs when the area of discussion is not taken as 
fixed. Since the participant s assume that they must use compromise t o 
achieve their objectives , they begin by trying to establish a strong 
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initial position. Bargaining and compromise are used by the participants 
until a common set of beliefs, goals, and criteria are attained. 
Electoral Politics Model 
"The Electoral Politics Model views policy as the r esult of 
electoral demands and supports. Participants in the foreign 
policy process formulate policies in order to win elections" 
(Weber 1977, p. 62) . 
This model has evolved from two earlier theories on political 
behavior; the first being from Anthony Downs. Downs believed that the 
actions taken by political groups or actors, such as political parties, 
interest groups, and individuals, were based on economic rationality. The 
primary goal was to maximize political support to become either elected or 
re- elected depending on the particular situation . This is based on the 
asswnption that the political actors are operating with their own self-
in terest in mind but within the confines of the law and without harming 
other s of the same political party . 
The second theory was developed by David Mayhew. Ma yhew agreed with 
Downs that the goal of the political actors is to become elected or re-
elected in order to achieve other goals and objectives when finally in 
office . However, he based his theory on the premise that politics was "a 
st ruggle among men to gain and maintain power" ( Mayhew 1975, p. 6 ) . 
The Electoral Politics Model was derived from several o f the 
attributes of these two theories but ignores others . Under this model, the 
political groups or actors desire either to occupy the office or to 
influence those in office in order to reap the benefits whic h accrue, those 
benefits being power, prestige, income, and to fulfill the desire for 
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conflict. Consequently, the groups or actors will formulate policies to 
attain office in order to achieve thes e goals rather than trying to attain 
off i ce in order to formulate policy. 
Although s imil a r in these aspects, the Elec t oral Politics Model is not 
based on the assumption that the groups or actors operate under economic 
rationality, and that they trying to maximize the political support of 
either their party or of other voters. They only try t o garner enough 
support to win the election or to influence the elected . 
Therefore, political groups or actors as well as their subordinates 
"will define the national interest in terms of their electoral perceptions 
and interests" ( Weber 1977, p . 62) . El ec t ed officials such as the 
President will work quid pro quo with the bureaucracies who have both 
domestic considerat ions, constituents, and who need Presidential support in 
order to carr y out policies which will in tur n r e- elect the President . 
Legislators oper ate in a similar manner. They , too, will devise 
foreign policy programs and actions which they contend will benefit their 
constituents . There are three ways in which this is possible; they can 
"l ) engage in mobilizing support for particular pieces of legislation; 
2) determine the content of the measures they vote on; and 3) affect the 
way in whic h the legislation is implemented by g iving post-enactment c lue s 
to the b ureaucracy" (Weber 1977, p . 63) . This strategy can also operate in 
the opposite manner by legislators opposing particular pieces of 
legislation. 
Lobby or special-interest groups will try t o influenc e public 
officials for the good of their constituen t s , who are also the constituents 
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of the office holder, by submitting proposals wh ich they claim will benefit 
the voter s . These policies in t urn can be utilized by the official to help 
determine the des ire s and needs of the voter in order t o appease them . The 
rationalit y of the proposal may be i gnored in o rd er to win the voter. 
However, sinc e both political gr oups and actors are onl y trying to 
gain a suffi cient number of votes fo r their cause and not th e maximum 
numbe r poss ible, t hey must be war y not to give the opposition o r vo t e r 
material o r cause to go again st them . This is to prevent the marginal vo t e 
necessary for victory from go ing to the oppos i tion . A fulle r, more 
comple t e under stand ing of these or ganizing concepts can be attained when 
this model i s employed in the analysis of g rain embargoes . 
The relat ions hips inherent within thi s model are very complex and give 
rise t o conflict . These conflicts can be r eso lved through the use of 
probl em solving , connnand, pers uasion (an appeal to common goals), 
compromise , and bargaining. All of these methods are utilized at various 
t i mes because of the numerous participants, values, and r esour ces involved 
in the model. 
For example, since both the first-term President and his subordinates 
are opt ing for his r e- election , their relations will be based on problem 
solving, command, and per suasion . However, this is rarel y the case when 
the Pr esident , the Cong r ess , and inter es t g r oups are involved . Because of 
the e l ec toral positions being sought o ut, t hese individuals and gr oups use 
persuasion, compr omise , and bargaining. Individ ual congressmen will use 
anal ytic (separating a problem into cons tituent elements) and bargaining 
stra t egies when dealing with each other . Lastly, "relations between 
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elected officials and the uncertain gene ral electorate will be based 
primarily on persuasion couched in ideological and patriotic appeals" 
(Webe r 1977, p . 65) . 
Organi zational Process Model 
The Org anizational Process Model views decision making as a result of 
organizational output instead of politics. It is concerned primar ily with 
implementation rather than the formulation of policies . Governmental 
action comes about from existing standard operating pr ocedures (SOPs) and 
organizational make- up of the collection of organizations which comprise 
the government . 
Shared Values and Personal Values Model 
These two paradigms deal with values and attitudes instead of 
politics and processes. They utilize the roles that belief systems play 1n 
the decision-making process. They help in establishing general sets of 
goals for decision makers and allow them to compare new experiences or 
situations with the old . By analogy with the past, decisions can be made 
concerning present events . This may be detrimental, since individuals 
often will recollect what happened but not why it happened . The situations 
surrounding the old and new experiences may be different, making the 
so lution for one inoperable for the othe r . 
There are certain conditions under whic h beliefs can change . An 
established belief will be re-evaluated by the individual wh e n new 
information that is contrary to the estab lished belief, is received in 
large quantities . An individual ' s vie ws may be r es tructured quickly when 
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this occurs. If the new information is received in small doses over long 
periods of time, the individual' s vie ws may then change mo r e slowly. 
The Shared Values Model cen t e r s upon the values and attitudes which 
individuals hold in colTUTlon as a r es ult of great shar ed experiences and 
events such as Depressions and World War s . These experiences and event s 
a r e i nstrumental in forming what is call ed a "national character ." The 
national char acte r of the United States is compri sed of such traits as : l) 
a high concern for private values, 2) a high degree of materialism and 
compe titiveness , and 3) strong id eals favoring equality among peoples and 
equal opportunity. These last t wo traits can be partially attributed to 
the vast material abundance of the United States. 
The idea of a high concern for private values leads Americans to 
react to fo r eign policy with inconsistent moods. These moods can be 
ca t egorized as: 1) Withdrawal - Intervention , wh er e Americans are 
indifferent during times of world stability and exert great pressure during 
times of perceived crises, 2) Mood - Simplification, where attitudes are 
unstructur ed during times of stability and oversimpl ified during times of 
crises, 3) Optimism- Pes simism, being optimistic during good times , falling 
t o pessimism during bad times , 4) Tolerance-Intolerance , where Americans , 
during times of c ri ses , a r e tolerant of ideological differences with allies 
and intolerant during time s of normal cy , 5) Idealism- Cyn icism, where 
American gene r osity and humanism are linked to a fea r of being taken 
advantage of, and 6) Superiority-Inferiority, where Americans tend to over-
react in thei r self- evaluations (Almond 1960, pp. 54- 65) . 
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The Shared Values Model assumes that decision makers possess these 
traits and c haracteristic s and thus define the national interest, when 
formulating policy, using a similar framework. 
The second paradigm, the Personal Values Model, concentrates on how 
"societal values and images are individually interpreted and combined with 
other values and attitude s whic h r esult from individual his t orical 
memories, political experiences, personal interests and idiosyncratic 
psychologies" (Weber 1977, p. 66) when defining national interests . This 
model is also influenced by the decision maker s ' psychological make-up, 
resulting from his genetic characteristics and acquired personalit y traits. 
Thus, government action is the result of individual s ' idiosyncratic 
behavior or beliefs. 
Groupthink Model 
The Groupthink Model, which is not related t o the other paradigms, was 
developed by Irving Janis and is described as "a mode of thinking that 
i nd i viduals engage in whe n they are deeply involved in a cohes iv e group" 
(Weber 1977 , p. 72 ) . Individual members' ability fo r ra tional thought is 
distorted when those members attempt to conform to gr oup thinking resulting 
from g roup pressure. Members al so l ose their ab ility to exerc i se their 
normal moral judgement and to we i gh alternative courses of action . At this 
point, an air of ov er-optimi sm develops as the group ' s thinking goes askew 
and the opposi tion or o utgr oup becomes r ebuked . Tilis is especial l y true 
the more closel y knit i s the group . The symp t oms of Groupthink are the 
g r oup develops an illusion of invulnerabil ity resulting in risk taking; 
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they try to rationalize their decisions no matter how irrational, and group 
dissenters are pressured into conformity. This confo rmit y results in an 
illusion of unanimity among the group . The last symptoms are a false sense 
of moral justification in their actions no matter how immoral they may be 
and a false sense that the outgroup's actions are immoral. Whereas several 
of the other models considered have a characteristic of diversification of 
goals or objectives, the Groupthink Model leads one t o expec t a distorted 
concensus among its member s . 
The five paradigms, plus the Groupthink Model, have been summarized by 
Weber in the following table. Since Weber ha s ex plicitly stated that he 
wanted to use several pure models to s tud y agricultural export policy, he 
has, in his summary table, onl y listed the key e l emen t s and characteristics 
of each model while e xcluding minor qualifying points other theori s t s have 
introduced. Consequently, some items which previously may have been 
included in the o riginal models, are not listed. 
Weber has concl ud ed that the El ectoral Politics Model has been the 
most useful paradigm in explaining the decision-making process in 
agricultural export policy. It will now b e seen if thi s mod e l can be 
applied to the three grain embargoes being scrutini zed and under what 
cr iteria this model will be successful given a similar situation, and, 
consequentl y , what are the weaknesses of the mode l ? In othe r words, what 
has the model failed to explain in t e rms of the decision-making process? 
Model 
Basic Unit of 
Analysis 
Organizing 
Concepts 
Process 
Mechanism 
Dominant 
Infe rence 
Bureaucratic Politics 
Government action as a 
result of politics within 
the executive branch 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
Players 1n positions 
Parochial perceptions 
and priorities 
Stakes and stands 
Position determines 
policy stance 
Organizational 
alliances 
Action channe l s 
Compromising and 
bargaining 
Government action = 
resu ltant of compromis ing 
and bargaining 
Electoral Politics 
Government Action as a 
result of electoral 
demands and supports 
Organizationa l Process 
Governmental action as a 
result of organizational 
output 
1. Players in office, 1. Factored problems 
Sequential attention 
to goals 
2 . 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6 . 
seeking office, or 2. 
seeking to influence 
those in office 3. 
Electoral demands 4. 
and supports 
Policies formulated 5 . 
1n order to win 
office 
Lobbies offering 6 . 
po 1 icies 
Subordinates sharing 
electoral goals 
Symbolic actions and 
tangible benefits 
SOPs 
Decisions of 
gove rnment leaders 
Government as 
constellation of 
organizations 
Organizations as 
receptors and 
effectors 
Problem solving, 
persuasion, compromising 
and bargaining 
Problem so lving 
Governme ntal action = 
resultant of electora l 
demands and supports 
Governmental action 
resultant of SOPs and 
programs 
Model 
Evidence 
- -- -------
Bureaucratic Politics 
Bureaucratic concerns for 
budgets , missions, 
control of personnel 
Electoral Po lit ics 
Manipulation of policy 
in orde r to increase 
e l ec t ora te satisfact i on 
Campaign promises 
Un committed thinki ng 
Organizat i ona l Process 
Grooved thinking 
Adaptation of past 
policies 
Incremental change 
- ----- ------ ----- - -----
Figure l-1. Summary out line of mode l s and concepts (Part I) 
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Mode l 
Basic Unit 
of Analysis 
Organizing 
Concepts 
Personal Values 
Governmental Action as a 
result of idiosyncratic 
behavior and beliefs 
l . Personal beliefs 
2. Career development 
3 . Influence of dramatic 
events 
4. Psychological make-up 
Shared Value 
Governmental action as a 
result of common po l itical 
socialization 
1. Attitudes and values 
widely shared by 
members of society 
2 . Societal values serve 
as guides 
3. Common experiences 
4 . National character 
5. Be liefs change a ft er 
dramatic national 
events and changes in 
personnel 
Groupthink 
Governmental action as a 
result of stable in-group 
concensus 
1. Illus i.on of 
invulnerability 
2. Collective efforts to 
rational decisions 
3. Belief in morality of 
in-group 
4. Opponents viewed 
negatively 
5. Pressure on dissenters 
6 . Self-censorship 
7 . 1 llus ion of unanimity 
8. Mind guards 
the 
Process 
Mechanisms 
Problem-solving 
persuasion 
Persuasion Problem so lving and persuasion 
Domi.nant 
Inference 
Mode l 
Evidence 
Governmental action 
intellectual baggage 
References to past 
personal history 
Personal standard of 
behavior 
Subordinants chosen on the 
basis of pe rsonal values 
Governmental action --~--ccwer:n-mental action 
common perceptions excessive unification 
Appeals to shared values 
Broadly defined goals 
Refe rences to national 
hist ory 
Presence of organ i.z i. ng 
concepts 
-------- -----·------- -------- ------------------- --·.---
Figure 1-1. Summary ou tline of mode l s a nd concepts (Part II) 
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CHAPTER III . AGRICULTURAL PHILOSOPHY OF THE UNITED STATES ANTI THE 
SOVIET UNION 
Before trying to predict how a nation will react to a particular 
chall enge or hardship, one must attempt to unders tand both its national 
characte r and its philosophy. What are the constituent e l ements of each? 
Why does it think and react the way it does? And how has it reacted in the 
past to accomplish its goals and objectives? 
To do this one must understand several key items: the first would be 
the type of poli tical system the nation functions under . More importantly, 
what were its past policies and objectives? The second would be the 
availability of essential resources for national self- sufficiency and well-
being, and how does the weather affect these resources? Thirdly, the least 
looked a t , but perhaps the most crucial factor many times, is the character 
of the people. How have the nation's adversities a nd successes affected 
them? What have the hardships of war and the effects of political policy 
1 change done to strengthen or weaken the people? 
United States Agricultural Situation 
The United States is characterized by an abundance of natural 
resources, especially agricultural resources . Ideal soil composition 
coupled with relatively stable and predictable weather patterns provide the 
best possib l e growing conditions for commodities anywhere in the world. 
1
The understanding of national charac t er is probably something best 
left to other social scientists than economists. Economists often assume 
much more homogeneity in people than other social scientists, as evidenced, 
e .g. , by assuming everyone has the same variables in the utility function . 
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Virtua ll y any type of food or feed stuff can be g r own somewhere in the 
Uni t ed States from grains to vegetables to cit rus . Once pr oduction is 
compl e t e , thi s produce can easi l y be moved on a river, lake , rail , and 
highway transportation system which connects th e major growing and consum-
ing r eg i ons of the country. These factor s along with the effic iencies of 
capitali s t production and the family farm make the United States the b r ead-
baske t of the wor ld . 
National Character 
This vast ma t eria l abundance has been a vital factor in allowing 
ci ti zens the adv an tage of fulfilling , to a degree , the American ideal of 
equality of opportun ity . This has caused Americans t o be highly 
i ndiv idualist ic and competit i ve . They are more concerned with " priva t e" 
v alues than social-group, political, or religious-moral values as a r e other 
cultures . As ex plained in Chapte r II , this has also led Americans to look 
at foreign policy in a diffe r ent ligh t than o the r cultures. 
The land reso urces of the United States have also allowed the American 
people to b e free of most of the hardships wh ich other people have had to 
endure . Ou t side of the sac r ifices of war and the Depression, the American 
people have lived in r elat ive ease compared to othe r s . F.ven during times 
of hardship, the sit uation fo r most Americans was not as c ritical as else-
where , where unemployment and inflation were much more severe , and their 
countries we r e torn by the physic al r avages of war. 
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United States Agricultural Policy 
The Eisenhower Administration 
One of the principal domestic problems facing the Eisenhower 
administration was the management of surplus commodities whic h had been 
developing since 1953 and continued throughout that decade. The 
administration decided to ship these commodities abroad to alleviate the 
price-dampening effects they c reated, which, in turn, transferred wealth to 
the American fa rm er. The policy action that accomplished this was the 
Agricultural Trade Devel opment and Assistance Act of 1954, wh ich con t ained 
the Public Law ( PL ) 480 program. This program transferred surplus 
commodities t o less- developed nations wh o , under the conditions of the 
program, were eligible for aid and conc essionar y sales . The governme n t 
financed the removal of these excess good s from t he market, which meant, of 
course, that the taxpaye r absorb ed the cos t . 
Third World nations r eceived these commod ities b y paying with 
i nconver tible c urrencie s which the Un it ed States gove rnment usua lly 
returned . The theo r y behind giving free food was that it would stop the 
spread of Communism into the Third World, because it would foster both 
economic and political stability . Along wi th this program came the 
condition that membe r s of the commun is t bl oc , partic ularly the Soviet 
Union, would not be permitted to benefit f r om the Act . The consequence was 
that man y Third World nations bec ame depend ent on the United States for 
food . This l ed to the que s tioning by American l eaders whether o r not the 
United State s was capable of feeding these people on a r egular basis and if 
it was wi se t o do so if it was possible. 
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The Kennedy-Johnson Administration 
Although food donations and concessionary sales were not increased 
much, the PL 480 ( Food for Pe ace ) program, and f oreign aid and economic 
ass istance were given ne w images during the Ke nnedy years. Kenned y used 
Food for Peace vigorously in Americ an foreign economic policy, because he 
also believed that i t would promote economic a nd political stability and 
thus keep communism out of the Third World. He did , however, deviate from 
past policy by all owing the Soviets t o purchase wheat f r om the United 
States in 1963 . As s t a t ed, this was only a deviation and not a r egula r 
practice. Communist bloc nations we r e s till barred from benefitting from 
the program. 
When Johnson g ained control of the Presidency, po licy began to change. 
As the surplus of agricultural commodities began to diminish, and as 
decision makers began to take notice of the emer ging g l obal f ood- populat i on 
crises, the idea of assisting the Third World with free economic aid came 
under c r i ticism during the mid-1960s (Weber 1977, p. 178) . Consequentl y , 
Congress b eg an to decrease funds to PL 480 in 1964 . Pr esident Johnson also 
began t o initiate prog rams of self- help and long-term c r edit in lieu of 
past concessionary sa l es . But while prepar ing for re-election in 1968 , 
Johnson reinstituted the concessionar y sa l es segment of PL 480 to mitigate 
the dampening price effec t s of the agricultural surplus which was 
r ecurr i ng . 
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The Nixon-Ford Administrations 
When Nixon took off ice , he was also faced with the problem of excess 
supply of agricultur al goods . This occurred with the rise of the Green 
Revolution, which decreased the need for United States food . This 
depressed exports and caused a recession in the domestic farm sector . The 
Nixon administration attempted to solve the problem by selling the grain to 
the Soviets, who needed it to improve consumer diets and make up for poor 
harvests . However, President Nixon, and later President Ford, also used 
the grain sales as a bargaining tool in an attempt to direct Soviet conduct 
in international relations . The Soviets began p.urchas ing so much g rain 
that in 1974 and 1975 President Ford was forced to regulate this action to 
prevent a depletion of United States reserves and prevent domestic food 
price inflation. This wa s accomplished at first through voluntary 
constraints by the multinational g rain exporters and later through 
negotia t ed grain agreements with the Soviets. 
By 1974, the situat ion had dramatically r eversed from one of sur plus 
to one of scarcity as the global food c r ises emerged . This caused a 
cont inued demand for United States grain stocks , which by then were 
becoming depl eted, and was partly caused by the increasing cost of 
fertilizers r esult ing from oil price increases . The Unit ed States 
increased the use of the Food for Peac e program and proposed a program for 
world-wide food reserves to the United Nations General Assembly in April 
and September of 1974 (Hopkins and Puchal a 1980, p. 64) . However, there 
was no agreed-upon r eaction to the s uggestion. 
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The Carter Administration 
The Carter Administration continued the policy of increasing agricul-
tural exports. Recognizing the importance of these exports to the Uni ted 
States economy and to foreign relations, President Carter set goals of 
reducing the barriers to trade and providing credits for exporters . He did 
this by adhering to the grain agreements signed under the Ford administra-
tion and by negotiating trade agreements at the Tokyo/Geneva rounds of the 
Multilateral Trade Negotiations in April of 1979. Although these agree-
ments did not have any dramatic economic ramifications, they did achieve 
the objective of reducing trade barriers. The principal participants 
besides the United States were Japan and the European Economic Community . 
Others involved were Canada, Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, and Australia. 
Export markets were given a further boost in 1978 when China opened its 
ports for foreign trade and became the United States' 20th leading 
customer. After establishing diplomatic relations in January 1979, the 
United States and China signed a grain agreement in October 1980. The 
Carter administration also continued the past policy of providing humani-
tarian aid for refugees in such nations and Kampuchea and Somalia. 
The Soviet's Union Agricultural Situation 
Although nearly 2 1/2 times as large as the United States in total 
land mass, only approximately 12% of the Soviet Union's land is suitable 
for grain production. This is because of the severe climate, which is 
similar to Canada and the North Central Plain States, and the large propor-
tion of poor soils . 
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At one time Soviet leaders consider ed land as an unlimited r esource. 
In order to increase agricultural production, one would just open more land 
for farming. However, since the most suitable land has been tapped and 
some lost to agriculture due to urbanization and erosion, it has been 
necessary to intensify production in order to gain an increased amount from 
each acre and thus increase output . 
Climate Climatic conditions are perhaps the most limiting factor 
in crop production. The climate not only limits what land can be brought 
into production but al so where s pecific crops can be grown . Production is 
constrained in the northern regions because of the extreme cold and short 
g r owing season . The southern region with its desert to semi- desert 
conditions lacks adequate precipitation . 
It is difficult to maintain steady growth ln production because of the 
variability in weather patterns. Late frosts and early snows occur 
f requently in almost all major growing regions with winterkill averaging 
around 15-20% per year and in some years reaching 30%. Approximately one-
third of the Soviet Union cannot be used for any agricultural production 
because of the cold , and an additional 40% is so cold that only hardy, 
early-maturing crops such as spring wheat, barley, and oats can be grown . 
This means that less than 30% of the country has temperatures which can be 
cl as sified as moderat e to warm, resulting in a high degree of competition 
among crops which requir e such warmth. However, as sta ted previously, 
these areas often lack adequate moisture for proper g r owth (ACLI 1979 , 
p. 5). 
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Annual rainfall over most of the agricultural land ranges from light 
to moderate (8 to 20 inches), but more than half of the land receives less 
than adequate moisture ranging from negligible to ligh t (O to 8 inches). 
The two most important growing region s are the northwestern and 
northern areas of the European Soviet Un ion and the steppes of the southern 
European Soviet Union, which stretches from the southe rn Ukraine and 
northern Caucasus through the Volga basin to southwestern Siberia ( cons ult 
map at end of chapter ). The former r egion is s upplied with fairly 
consistent and adequate moisture, which comes from the Baltic sea , but the 
latter r egion is g rossl y deficient in moisture. Not only are the southern 
steppes subject to drought but also to the famous sukhovey winds. These 
are hot, dry winds which occur several times a month, mostly during the 
summer . When a sukhovey occurs , the relative humidity falls below 30%, 
winds fluctuate from 5-30 mil es per hour, and temperatures range from 80 to 
110 degrees Fahrenheit . Plant damage is high , because these relentless 
winds do not allow plants to "rest" and restore their turgor or strength 
(ACLI 1979, p. 7). 
Soil Unfortunately for the Soviets, the poorest soil types cover 
almost 70% of the land area. The majority of the poor soil is in the 
northern areas that r eceive the highest rainfall. These soils are known as 
the Podzols ( a Russian term meaning und erlain with ash) . They are 
characterized by a lack of nutrients, high ac idity, leaching, poor wat e r 
and nutrient holding and storing capacity, and are highly subject t o 
erosion (ACLI 1979 , p. 8) . Thus, they underutilize both the available 
water and ferti l izer which is applied . 
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To the so uth of the Podzols lay the Chernozems and Chestnut soils (the 
Chestnuts being the southern most soils short of the desert region) . These 
soils st r etch from West to East and include the Ukra i ne, north Caucasus, 
central Che r no zem, Moldavia, and through southern Volga , and into northern 
Kazakhstan and west Siberia . Although covering onl y 15% of the total land 
area, this region yields 70% of all grain production . They ar e the most 
fe rti le soils in t he Soviet Union and can be compa r ed to those found in 
Canada and the central Plains Stat es . The Chernozems are similar to the 
soils of northe r n Saskatc he wan, Alberta through Manitoba, the eas te r n 
Dakotas and wes t e rn Minnesota, while the Chestnuts are similar to those 
soi ls west of the Rocky Mountains and west of the United States black soils 
belt (ACLI 1979, p . 9). 
National Character 
"In an age grown skeptical of undiluted pat rio tism, Russians a r e 
perhaps the wor ld ' s most passionate patriots . Without question, 
a deep a nd tenancious love of country is the most powerful 
unifying fo rce in the Soviet Un ion, the most vital element in the 
amalgam of loyalt ies that cement s Soviet society" (Smith 1976 , 
p. 303) . 
This sense of patriotism and national pride is an ext r emely st r ong 
emo t ion possessed by the Soviet peopl e. This is especially true when 
dealing with outs id ers or foreigners . They feel tha t it is their duty to 
defend the Motherland (Rodina) at all costs . Although they have the 
typical complaints about shortages , prices , and working conditions, they 
still have an unquestioned confidence in their way of life. They cannot 
conc eive of the Motherland as eve r being wrong in terms of i t s system and 
policies. They c annot comprehend of their country as being unvirtuous o r 
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immoral, much as Americans viewed the United States before Viet Nam as 
being incapable of immoral behavior . 
Perhaps the most unifying force for the people, besides the love of 
the Motherland, is the heroic struggle which they waged during World 
War II. Whereas for most Americans, that War is in the distant past; for 
the Soviets it is still a part of everyday life . At major battle fields 
and in virtually every city there are war memorials commemorating turning 
points in the war and praising the 20,000,000 who died . One of th e most 
famous of the memorials is at the Piskarevka Cemetary in Lening rad which 
stands as a reminder of ~he 900-day siege of that city. Smith in his study 
of the Soviet peoples analyzes their thinking this way: 
" A history of invasions from the Mongols and Napoleon through 
Hitler, of peasant revolt s and civil wars, of czars and boyars 
mounting secret cabals or royal father out to kill royal son just 
as St alin intrigued against and liquidated his fellow 
revolutionaires has made Russians prize order and security as 
much as Americans prize freedom. Most Russians, it seemed t o me, 
are so genuinely dismayed at the unemployment, cr ime, political 
assassinations, drugs, and labor strife in American life that 
they prefer instead the disadvantages of censorship , police 
controls, arbitrary arrests, labor camps and enforced 
intellectual conformity . As I list ened to older Russians 
describe their terrible ordeals, it gave me some appreciation why 
they recoil fr om any threat o f instability. Some have lived near 
edge of the apocal ypse most of their lives . .. . The Russian obeys 
power, not the law. And if Power i s l ooking the other wa y , o r 
simply does not notice him, the Russian does what he thinks he 
can get away with. This undercurrent of lawlessness and 
unrulines s in the Russian temperament comes out in the many odd 
bits of l ife that authorities cannot contro l . The pervasive 
corruption i s one sign of it" (Smith 1976, pp. 334-335). 
Thus, the hardships which the people hav e had to end ure in terms of 
war and famine, coupled with the l ove of the Mothe rland, have served to 
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make the Soviet peopl e immune t o many everyday hardsh ips and has developed 
a strong national character and s trength wh ic h is no t easily jarred . 
Soviet Agricultural Policy 
Agriculture plays an extremely important rol e in Soviet polit ics . 
Party heads c an rise or fall depending, in part, on their compet ence in 
agricult ural leadership. For exampl e , Mal enkov, Stalins's first s uccesso r, 
resigned in February 1955 , after he demon s tra t ed a lack of knowledge about 
agricultur e . His downfall led t he wa y for Kh rushchev's ri se , wh ich was 
s purred on by his agricultural initiatives and innovations. Khrushchev, 1n 
turn, was ove rthrown in October 1964 , after his au t horit y was diminish ed by 
the 1963 agricultural disaster. Recognizing agricultur e ' s import ance , 
Brezhnev, afte r his election as First Sec r etary , presented as his fi r st 
init i ativ e a program t o so lv e the nat i on ' s agricultural c rises. Thus, it 
can be seen that the Soviet s do not take agricult ura l politics and event s 
lightl y . 
The Stalin ye ars 
Agriculture suffered tremendous l y under Stalin . Du r ing hi s reign, 
which l asted until 1953 , agricultural annual outpu t nev e r exceeded that 
pr od uc ed befor e the 1913 Revolution . During the early Stalini s t period, 
the r e was a mov e initiated to eliminate the kulaks , or prosperous farmers, 
and co ll ectivi ze the farms unde r Sta t e c ontro l . This r esulted in an actual 
r ed uc tion i n fa rm o ut put which cu lminated in the famine of 19 32/33 whic h 
cos t an estimated five million lives . Whil e thi s was occ urr ing, Stalin 
con tinued food export s . He a l so exported food during a poor harvest in 
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1946 t o Poland and East Germany ev en though there were report s of 
cannibali sm in the Ukraine (Hopkins and Puchala 1978, p. 95) . 
While in power Stalin had refused to aid the State farms financially 
and even tr ied t o squeeze more money ou t of them. He did this to finance 
the industrial-military complex. This r esulted in such poor g rain produc-
tion that there were times wh en the state had to draw down its reserves to 
feed the populace. This occurred while Malenkov, who at the time was 
Stalin' s supervisor of agriculture, was announcing that the grain problem 
was solved. 
The Khruschev yea r s 
During the Khruschev era (and later the Brezhnev era), however, the 
agricultural situation vastly improved. He reversed the declining trend by 
providing fi nanc ial aid and incentives for farmers. Since his time agri-
cultural investment increased in eve r y one of the post-Stalin Five Year 
Plans . 
He also opened the Virgin Lands. During the Plenum of February and 
March of 1954, the Central Committee adopted a proposal made by Khrushchev 
to cultivate these l ands . They are an area in Soviet Central Asia and 
Siberia which cover 101,207,000 acres (Talbott 1974, p. 120) . This 
proposal was contrary to the past agricultural policy of Stalin, who was 
vehementl y opposed to opening new territory for production. 
Getting this proposal adopted wa s difficult for Khruschev, since there 
were those at the Plenum who were against the exten sification of agricul -
ture but instead wanted intensification. For Khruschev intensification 
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meant developing agriculture f or the futur e instead of for the present, 
which was what the people needed. In order to increase the yields per 
acre, the Soviets would have needed an experienced farm labor force and 
more material r esour ces . Both at that time were scarce. There was also 
opposition f r om the members who represented the heavily populated regions 
of Kazakhstan, since resources wo uld have to be diverted from them. 
Nevertheless, Khruschev won enough suppo rt and in 1954 began to r ecruit 
workers from the Communist Youth League. 
The Virgin Lands have been at times the salvation of Soviet 
agriculture. It contributed significant ly to the bumper. crops of 1956 and 
1958 which pr ompted Khruschev to state that the Sovie t Union would soon 
overtake the United States in per-capita production of meat, milk, and 
butter . Also, after the poor harvest of 1963 , r ecord production i n the 
Virgin Lands not only made up the def i cit but provided a six- month surplus. 
Thus, Khruschev's gamble to open these lands has paid off in some 
years at least . 
However, his programs began to flounder. The Virgin Lands were being 
exploited , and consequently its productivity dec r eased . At the December 
1959 Central Committee Plenum, Khruschev proposed new programs which would 
increase output . He proposed replacing oats with corn , ignoring crop 
rotations, a nd adding more investment . Aft e r much pe r sistence on his part, 
his first two proposals were accepted, but the latter was not . Since 
investment funds would have to be diverted f r om both the industrial and 
defense sectors, there was a great deal of resistence by those who 
advocated the advancement of these areas . Khruschev ' s persistence t o gain 
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this third concess i on only resulted in the alienation of powerful segments 
of the party, government, and military (Hahn 1972, p . 4) . This , with the 
1963 agricultur al failure and several foreign policy blunders (most notably 
the Cuban missile crisis), led to his overthrow in October 1964 . 
The Brezhnev years 
However, as early as the March 1965 Plenum, the Part y members began to 
realize that increased investment was indeed necesary. But additiona l 
investment was on ly allocated when agricultural conditions present ed c ri sis 
situations. Thus, whe n agricultural production began to meet expectations, 
the funds were diverted back to the consumer goods, military , and heavy 
industry sectors . 
It was not until July 1970 that those lobbying for agriculture won 
enough s upport to have investment and resource allocation increased . This 
was predominantly for increasing livestock production, since meat shortages 
were reaching crisis proportions . 
It was at this same time that Brezhnev , the leading proponent of 
livestock production improvements, solidified his position as head of the 
Politburo . After that time he made it clear tha t improving the consumers ' 
diets would have a high priorit y . In orde r to accomplish this, a new " food 
prog r am" was developed whic h invo lved reorganizing government b ureaus fo r 
better coordination and functioning. New ministers also were appointed for 
various connnodit i es, and new departments were developed . 
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Soviet Union Agricultural Production 
The production of agricultural commodities in the Sov iet Union comes 
f r om two sector s . The first is the socialized sector, which consists of 
the State and collective farms ( t he State fa rms practice a higher form of 
socialism and con form more c l osely t o communis t ideol ogy) . The other 
sec t or is the private sector, which cons ist s of small g arden plots and 
individual livestock holdings . The former accounts fo r 2/3 of all 
agricultural output , wh ile the latter accounts fo r 1/3 . 
Stat e farms differ from co llective farms in three ways. First, 
s t a t e farms are larger, averaging nearly 50 ,000 acres of plan t ed g r ound, or 
they are lar ge livestock e nte r prises . The diffe r enc e , of cour se, depends 
on the location and area of specialization. The huge s izes of these farms 
result in them cultivating one-half of the total sown area. Although the y 
have greater economies of scale and ar e exposed to better technol ogy than 
the co ll ec tiv e farms, their production is often below expecta t ions . 
Secondly , state farms and their out put are own ed by the State and their 
wor ke r s are stat e employees. All pr od uction is sold to gover nment 
procurement agenc ies at fixed prices . Employees ' monthly wages are based 
on r eg ul ated government ra tes with bonuses being gran ted at the year ' s end 
if there was any pr oduction sold in excess of the fa rm' s pr edetermined 
goal . Thirdl y , they are specialized in operation fo r a spec i fic purpose or 
s pec ialty (i . e . , each produces g rain, o r live s t ock , o r poultr y but not 
all) . 
Collective f arm s are different in tha t they have f ami ly members who 
gain their membership rights through birth. These families shar e the 
39 
profits of the farm with wages being based on either time or piece work. 
Bonuses are doled out in a manner similar to the state farms. They also 
differ because they do not specialize in production but instead grow grain 
and raise livestock and poultry. 
One feature of the co llective farm which causes criticism from party 
officials is that members tend to work according to their own schedule. 
However, the y are expected to work on a full-time basis with their brigade 
(bas ic work force of the collective farm) and can be penalized if they do 
not complete a minimum number of work days. Although it has family 
members, it is still controlled by the Communi_st Part y . Problems have 
arisen when the Party tries to initiate c hange, since the family community 
is very conservative and maintains its traditional values and ways. 
Almost all Soviet citizens a r e granted the right to own a private plot 
and livestock for personal use . The maximum s ize of a plot can only be 
between 1/2 - 3/4 of an acre including any structures . These plots 
resemble backyard g ardens in the United States . Production is intended 
only for the private use of the family , but anything grown in surplus is 
allowed to be sold in the markets of collective farms. The production 
which results from these plots is a very important plus when it comes to 
meeting planned production goals in vegetables, eggs, and livestock. It is 
estimated that they account for 30% - 40% of total production of these 
commodities. 
Previously, the private ownership of these plots and livestock were 
criticized by Party members, since they are contrary to Communist ideology. 
But it is now recognized that without this private production ther e would 
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be a serious disruption in the food supply; consequently, production in 
this manner is highly encouraged. Since late 1978 it has been official 
Soviet policy that all inputs used in the production process on State and 
collective fanns be also used on the pr ivate plots and in raising 
livestock . 
Soviet agriculture is cha racterized by its high labor intensity. It 
now directly employs 25% of the t o tal work force . Even with this large 
pe r centage of workers, there have been times when bo th urban workers and 
the Army have had to be mobilized to help with the harvest (this naturally 
reduces the productive capacity in o ther sectors). The r easons fo r the 
relatively low output per farm worker are imperfections in agricultural 
technology and the lack of inc entives throughout the entire agricultural 
chain . Technologica l lags have r esulted from insufficient capital 
investment. In the past, investment was concentrated in the industrial and 
military complexes. This is now changing as agriculture is r eceiving a 
priorit y share of capital investment . A lack of incentives has resulted in 
the production of poor quality inputs , which hampe r s productivity. 
For example, a fertilizer plant manager may be more concerned with 
total tonnage produced than with quality, since he knows the farmer has no 
recourse but to accept shipment because of a lack of an alternative source . 
Also , production goals are sometimes met by distorting the figures . Feed 
and fertilize r may arrive at a farm several tons short of the original 
order ; the conswning farm being the victim of a production manager short-
weighing to meet his Plan. The consuming farm might then overcount the 
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number of eggs to be col lected or short-weigh their production to meet 
expected goals . 
Another barrier to increasing agricultural productivity is the 
centralized management of the State and collective farms. Centralized 
planning and direction tends to inhibit creative farm management and 
discourages innovation and transit i on to new techn iques (Hopkins and 
Puchala 1978, p . 94). Although this barrier has been recognized, it does 
not appear likely to be reformed. Since centralization is the keystone to 
the Soviet system, any attempt t o disrupt it is political suicide. In 1973 
Politburo member Gennad i Voronov had his career ended when he advocated the 
decentralization of State and collective farms. A similar s ituation 
occurred after the 1975 harvest failure wh en Soviet Minister of 
Agriculture, Dutitre Polyansky, opposed excess ive farm centralization. In 
fact, the Soviets moved towards even greater centralization when, in June 
of 1976, the Central Committee endorsed a policy of "agro- industrial 
integration" (Hopkins and Puchala 1978, p. 95). 
Consequently, an increase in agricultural productivity will have t o 
wait until capital investments are transformed into technological 
improvements, s ince the Sovie t s probably will not significantly alter their 
system. 
Fertilizer use 
Sinc e the early 1960s, the Soviets have giv en fertilizer use a high 
priority in helping to increase total grain output. The world rat e of 
increase in fertilizer use has tripled since the early 1960s, and the 
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Soviets' rate of increase has been twice the world rate. The positive 
impact of this increase has been below potential because of problems in 
quality, storage, and application technology. At this time only half of 
the grain crop acreage is fertilized. Although fertilizer use has 
increased dramatically since the early 1960s, the production of fertilizer 
has fallen behind planned goals . The 1976-80 Five Year Plan called for 
annual increases in production of 6 million tons, while actual increases 
only averaged approximatley 2 2/3 million tons . The enlargement of plant 
capacity has also fallen behind schedule. The 1976- 80 Five Year Plan 
called for an additional 53 million tons of production capacity, but by 
1979 only half of this had been accomplished. 
This failure to increase production capacity will, of course, make the 
1980-85 agricultural production goals unattainable. The 1980 plan called 
for production of 143 million tons of grain or a 50% increase over actual 
1978 performance. The 1985 plan calls fo r production of 170 million tons, 
which in light of the slow capacity growth appears unreasonahle (ACLI 1979, 
p. 14). This naturally will severely handicap the ability to attain goals 
set for future grain production. 
Future grain production will also be hampered by a shortage of 
adequate irrigation, machinery, drying and storage facilities, and spar e 
parts. The inadequacies in these areas result in a loss in potential grain 
output and in matured grain that will not be harvested in time or will 
spoil after harvest. 
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Grain production 
These inadequacies have also caused the Soviet Union difficulty in 
maintaining a steady supply of food for its population. As stated before, 
there have even been periods of famine earlier this century which were 
exacerbated by political decisions (Stalin continued grain exports to 
improve hard currency r eserves) . 
During the 1950s and 1960s, they did become self- sufficient in most 
years, but their diets were at a substandard level. This has begun to 
change, as ove r the past ten years the official Sovie t polic y has been to 
upgrade the diet by increasing livestock and egg production . This , of 
course, translates into an increased demand for grain. Since 1960 average 
total g rain production has increased by 80% o r by 6 million tons per year. 
Most of this increase has re s ulted from an increase in fertilizer use . 
Before this time, the Soviets depended on expanding acreage to increase 
grain production. 
Of the grain which is produced , wheat is by far the most important. 
The Soviets are the world 1 s largest produc er, harvesting nearly 25% of the 
world total . This is approximately double the United States's output . It 
is grown so extensively simply because it is more adapt ab le to the adverse 
weather and growing conditions than other grains. Wheat and barley (grown 
for the s ame reason as wheat) comprise the majority of livestock feed and 
account for 75% of total grain product ion. Corn, on the o the r hand , plays 
a less e r r o l e . The conditions fo r corn production barel y exist because of 
the severe weather. Less than 20% of the acreage planted in corn matures, 
the rest being used as silage and green feed fo r livestock . 
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The Soviets have r epeated ly failed to meet the goals set fo r g rain 
production . In the past decade, their objective for annual average grain 
production for the 9th (1971 - 75) and 10th (1976-80) Five Year Plans were 
set at 195 million tons and 220 million tons respectively . The 11th Five 
Year Plan call s fo r production at 240 million tons (ACLI 1979, pp . 26- 27) . 
It is doubtful that they will meet the goals of the 11th Five Year Plan 
just as they failed in the previous two . The majority of these 
planned increases were to be obtained by increasing yields instead of 
ac r eage . The only way increasing yields seems possible would be by 
improving agricultural t echnology dramatically , especially fertilizer 
technology. 
Livestock production 
One of the primary objectives of Soviet agriculture is the increase in 
output of livestock products . This fact is evident in a speech by General 
Secretary Leonid Brezhnev at the November 1979 Pl e num of the Communist 
Party's Central Committee: 
"The primary obligation of l eaders of the agricultural branch and 
local party and soviet o rganizations, specialists and all animal 
husbandry workers is that of achieving a conside rabl e increase in 
meat production throughout the country" (U . S .D.A.: U. S. Sales 
Suspension 1980, p. 3). 
This is to help upgrade the consumer ' s diet and to meet the growing demand 
for meat . Soviet policy has helped fuel this demand, since meat prices 
have been held constant since 1963 despite increasing costs of production 
and increasing personal incomes . This has caused the production/ 
consumption gap to wid en despite efforts to increase production as rapidly 
as possible. 
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Soviet leaders realize the impor tance the consumer places on a high 
quality diet, since the consumer uses meat availability as a barometer of 
economic conditions; therefore, they are doing much to fulfill consumer 
demands. Meat availability is also used as an essential element in 
encouraging greater labor pr oductivity. The Soviets also realize that the 
widening gap represents a latent demand for livestock products which could 
antagonize the population into riots similar to the food riots which 
occurred in 1962 under Khruschev (which the Soviet Army had to quell) and 
the 1970-71 food riots in Poland. Workers did show their discontent when a 
widespread shortage of meat and dairy products prodded Soviet auto .workers 
to strike in Togliatti a nd Gorky in May and June of 1980 . (Auto workers 
ar e some of the highest paid laborers, and Togliatti and Gorky are two of 
the best provisioned cities . ) This is exactly what the Soviet leadership 
wants to avoid. 
In an attempt to increase livestock production to meet demand, the 
Soviets must, of course, increase feed avail ab ili ty. In the past after a 
poor harvest they would engage in "belt tightening" and/ or "distress 
slaughter" and then curtail consumption until production and herd numbers 
were brought back into line. It appears now that they are no l onger 
willing to do this as evidenced by the fact that after the poor harvest in 
1972 the Soviets instead began to l ook abroad for food and feed g rains. 
Even with r ecord production the Soviets have imported grains for livestock. 
In 1979 they actually tried to expand livestock output despite their worst 
harvest in four years. Apparently, the Soviets are trying to hold to the ir 
objective of increasing livestock product output. Hence, the maintenanc e 
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of livestock numbers and livestock product output appears to be one of the 
majo r factors 1n decisions to import grains . 
However, it seems unlikely that the Soviets will achieve the goals set 
fo r the future (19 . 5 million tons of meat output by 1985) for two reasons: 
1) even if g r ain production met planned goals, which is doubtful, it would 
still be 10-16 million tons sho rt of feed requirements; and 2) if the 
present g rain output trend continues , the resulting gap between actual 
grain production and grain requirements would be gr ea ter than import 
capacity . In o rd e r to sustain present 1981-85 livestock plans, average 
annual grain imports would have to approach 25 million tons (ACLI 1979, 
p. 44). If these goals are to be kept by Soviet leader s, there wll be 
severe ramifications in other sectors, both in the domestic and 
in ternational arenas. 
Political-Economic Perspectives 
Pol itical economic theorists have attempted to explain , and at times 
find a solution for the wo rld food problem by placing it into the 
perspectives of different theories or ideol ogies . These theories and 
ideologie s range from the market-economy (capitalist) perspective, to the 
Marxist perspective, all the wa y to the "Doomsday" or lifeboat ethics 
perspective . 
These political economic theories or ideologies can also be used to 
explain or c larify (but not justify) the past policy actions of both the 
United States and the Soviet Union . 
For instance, the Marxist perspective states that the world food 
problem can be so lved by changing the socio-economic sphere, which the 
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Soviets have attempted to do not only in agriculture but throughout their 
entire system . Thus, certain elements or traits can be chosen eclectically 
from seve ral diffe r ent perspectives to help in this explanation and 
clar ification pr ocess. 
Unit ed States 
The United States ' policies can be explained i n terms of the relative 
free market economy or capitalist perspective. In the past, United States 
farm policy was characterized by price supports and set- asides which 
limited farmers' mar keting and production options . In 1965 policy began to 
change; moving to a les s regulated economy whe r e farmers were allowed to 
make planting decisions as they saw fit. The ag r icultur al economy was also 
aided because o f the utilization of grain for foreign policy use . As 
explained previously, th is was done t o decrease surplus, help Third World 
nations, and t o fulfill the demand from developed nations. 
Capitalists believe that a free market economy provides the best 
incentive for innovation and the most efficient production possible . They 
also feel that this is true for the world ecoPomy . Allow the free market 
to operate so that comparative advantage can be practiced to its fullest is 
their view . 
Unlike the Soviets, the United States has coope rated with other 
nations in a tt empting to solve the world food problem . This has been done 
by PL 480 shipment s as well as by participating in world food conferences 
and providing agricul t ural data and technology. These actions can be 
expl ained, t o a certain degree , by the theological perspective. The 
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American people , because of their conscience, feel compassionate towa rd 
their fellow man and thus have attempted to help them by pr oviding aid . 
Soviet Union 
There are two political-economic perspectives which can be used 
selectively t o help expl a i n past Soviet policies . They ar e the Marxist and 
the "Doomsday" or life boat ethics pe r sepctives . 
The Ma rxis t pe r spective , as put forth by Ma r kov, states that inade-
quate production and unequal distribution are not caused by psychological , 
bio l ogical , and demographic factors as capital is t economi sts state bu t by 
socio- economic fac t or s . The Marxists believe that many nations have a food 
problem because of the imperialist policy of capitalist nations . 
Capitalist nations, along with the mult i national corpo rat ions, impede the 
growth and development of foreign dome s t ic markets and economic progress 
because of the expl o itation which results from thei r investments in those 
countr ies . The r e turn on their investments is typically quite high, which 
means tha t these nations are being exploited, since they are not being paid 
fo r their products and services what many wou l d deem fa ir. The vast 
ma jorit y of this foreign investment goes to the government and large land 
holders and is seldom passed on to the tenants . Thus , the tenant can nev er 
accumulate enough capita l to invest o n his own and expand his agricultur al 
o utput. 
In ord e r fo r a nation to comba t its food pr oblem , socio- economic 
change must take place. In Lenin ' s word s ... 
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"A real st r uggle against famine is inconceivable without the 
appeasement of the peasants' land hunger, without the relief from 
the crushing pressure of taxes, without an improvement in their 
cultural standard, without a decisive change in their legal 
status, without the confiscation of the landed estates - without 
a rev o 1 u t ion" ( Ta lb o t l 9 77 , p . 2 1 ) . 
A nation' s food problem will thus be solved when man stops exploiting his 
fe llow man; when the working man is lifted from pove r ty , and when nations 
establish a system of cooperation. However , the Soviets have deviated from 
the concept of mutual cooperation among nations when solving the food 
problem . 
Despite having an active rol e in the international food system , the 
Soviets still follow a policy of independence when it comes to the world 
food situation. Although they did send representatives to the 1974 Rome 
Wo r ld Food Confe r ence and to the meetings of the World Food Council, it was 
primar ily to learn about the agricultural policies of other nations instead 
of to share information, which they refus ed to do . They have also r efused 
to join the majority of international organizations and programs such as 
the Internat ional Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) and the Global 
Information and Earl y Wa rn ing System ( under the FAO), since they would be 
r equi r ed to share information about their grain reserve policy, which they 
consider as part o f national security . (It is believed that the Sovie t s 
have accumulated lar ge underground "war reserves" of grain which are 
segregated from their peacetime reserves.) Of course, the Soviets do not 
provide any financial support fo r these organizations and programs either . 
The Soviets apparently feel no obligation towards alleviating the 
world food problem which exists today and are even inclined to enter the 
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world market during times of world food scarcity 1n order to fulfill their 
own goals at the expense of Third World nations who may be more in need . 
Thus, the Sovie t s seem to be adhering also to the "Doomsday" or 
li feboa t ethics perspective. This perspective is based on the concept that 
the world has a limited capacity of productive resources which are quickly 
being depleted because of the demand created by an ever increasing 
population. This stems particularly from the Third World . Because of this 
ever increasing population, the world, given its present course of trying 
to feed the multitudes, will meet its doom . To prevent this, someone will 
have to be sacrificed. The Soviets seem to be determined not to be the 
ones t o be sacrificed . 
The Soviets are not exploiting their fellow man by entering the market 
when others are in more need but in effect are taking advantage of their 
position of relative wealth by purchasing f ood and feed grains which could 
have gone to the Third World . 
The United States has recognized the selfish attitude of the Sov i ets 
as well as felt the effects of their policy actions when dealing with food 
and feed g rains. Consequently, in an attempt to regulate the Soviets ' 
actions, the United States, being the largest supplier in the international 
arena, forced the Soviets into signing g rain trade agreements. This will 
be the subject of the next chapter . 
Figure 3-1 . U. S . S . R. a gricultural regime and North America n ge ogr a phic ana l ogues 
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(Note: Smaller economi c r eg i ons in west ern part identified by numbers 
below, with Ukraine ou tlined by dark borde r ) 
Ukraine incl . 1 . Southwest 2 . Donets Dneper & 3 . South. Ot her numbers 
identify 4 . Moldavia SSR 5 . Beloruss ia 6. Baltic 7. Centra l 
Chernozem 8. Volga-Vyatka 9 . North Caucuses 
10. Tr anscaucusus 11. Turkmen SSR 12 . Uzbeck SSR 13 . Tadzhik 
& Ki r giz SSRs. 
PRINCIPAL AREAS OF CROP PRODUCTION AND NORTH AMERICAN ANALOGUES 
Winter Wheat N. Caucusus, Donets Dnepr, South, Southwest / South Dakota, 
Wyoming 
Rye Vo lga, Ural & Volga- Vyatka / Montana, No rth Dako ta, British 
Columbia 
Spring Wheat Kazakhstan, Volga , West Siberia, Ural / Alber ta , 
Saskatchewan 
Ba rley Cent ral Chernozem, Volga, N. Cauc usus , Donets Dne pr , 
Sou t hwest, Sout h, Belorussia, Baltic , Central / North and 
South Dakota, Montana 
Oa ts West Siberia, Ura l, Volga-Vyatka / Cent r a l Alaska , Alberta 
Corn Donets-Dnepr, Southwest, South, N. Caucusus , Moldavia / 
South Dakota, Western Nebraska 
Soybeans ( Sb)--Far East/ Manitoba 
Cotton Uzbek, Turkmen, Kazakhstan/ New Mexico 
Sunflowe r Donets-Dnepr, N. Caucusus / South Dakota 
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U.S.S . R. and North American Ana l ogous 
North America 
Anchorage, Alaska: 
Edmonton, Albert a : 
Winn ipeg, Manitoba: 
Minneapolis, Minnesota: 
Des Moines , Iowa : 
Denver, Colorado: 
Albuquerque, New Mexico: 
U. S . S . R. 
Leningr~dL Russian S . F . S . R. 
Rost on, Geor gian S.S . R. 
Moscow, Russian S . F.S.R. 
Kustanay, Kirgiz , S . S . R. 
Tselinograd, Ki r giz S . S.R. 
Kiev, Ukrainian S.S . R. 
Latitude 
61. lON 
53 . 30N 
49.SON 
44 . 58N 
41. 35N 
39.43N 
35.50N 
59 . 55N 
57 . llN 
55 . 45N 
53.15N 
51 . lON 
50 . 28N 
Longitude 
149.50W 
113 . 30W 
97.lSW 
93 . 20W 
93 . 37W 
105.lOW 
106.47W 
30.25E 
39 . 23E 
37.42E 
63 . 40E 
71. 30E 
30 . 29E 
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CHAPTER IV . UNITED STATES - SOVIET UNION GRAIN TRADE AND AGREEMENTS 
Numerous fac t ors we r e instrumental i n b ringing the United States and 
the Sovie t Union togethe r to negotiate the grain agreements in 1975 . At 
that time the United States ' grain reserves had been drawn down by previous 
large purc ha ses by the Soviets and several other nations, which ln turn 
r esulted in higher con sumer prices . The size of these Soviet pu r chases had 
not only surprised t he United Stat es gove rnment but caused a domestic 
uproar as well. Also, si nce the Soviets had sec r e tl y negotiated these 
dea l s with private multinat ional g rain companies, the r e wa s conc e r n t hat 
the multinationals had procured undue profits. 
To pr event the Soviets from making ano ther large and unexpected 
pur chase, United States decis i o n makers deemed it appropriate t o cont r ol 
any futur e trad e through agreements . Although the Soviets would pr obabl y 
have liked t o continue their dealing s c landestinely , they r elented to sign 
the agreemen t s for r easons of their own. The Soviets needed g rain for use 
in f ood and feeding, and since the Unit ed States was pr obably the on l y 
nation capable of fulfilling the Soviets' needs, they (the Soviets ) were ln 
effect forced t o negotiate. 
Unti l the time of the 1972 g rain purchases from the United States , the 
Soviets had been buying gr ai n from the Canadians and the Australians . As 
mentioned in Chapter Ill, the United States had permitted the Soviets t o 
purchase gra i n only once before , which wa s in 1963 . There we r e two primar y 
reasons fo r this lack of trade; the first was because of the " Cold War", 
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and the second was the sti pulation that 50% of the g rain so ld to centrally 
planned nations would have to b e shipped in United States vessel s. 
1972 Grain Sales to the Soviet Un ion 
With Pr es iden t Nixon in office , and with the advent of dete n t e , 
fo r eign policy began to c hange . A year before the 1972 sales, 
Presid ent Nixon initiated steps to open trade with the Communist bloc 
nation s by lifting several barriers to expor t . He did this on June 10 , 
1971 , by e liminating the need for private gr ain companies to obtain 
perm ission from the Department of Commerce to se ll gra i n to these nations . 
He also lifted the requirement that United States vessels had t o transport 
50% of the gr ain sold . Then Secretar y of Agricultur e Earl Rutz was sent to 
the Soviet Union to negot i ate a c r edit agreement. This agreement was 
i nstituted on Ju l y 8, 1972, when President Nixon ar rang ed for the Commodit y 
Cr edit Corporation t o supply t he Soviets with the necessa r y credit to 
pur chase a minimum of 5750 million worth o f grain over a three- year period . 
This c r edit was at an interest r ate of 6% in amoun ts up to $500 million 
including a $200 million loan the first year ( Hamilton 197 2 , p . 289). 
The l ifting of these trade barriers and the signing of the c redit 
agreement s clear ed the way for repr esentative s of the Soviet Expo r tkhleb 
and the Co ntinental Gra in Compan y t o sec r et l y negotia t e a transaction which 
i ncluded 134 million bushels of wheat and 16 1 million b ushels of corn . 
Less than one month late r the Soviets purchased an additional 260 mil lion 
bushels of whea t, 72 million bushels of corn, and 34 million bushels of 
soybeans (Des tl er 1980, p . 38). It wa s apparent that the agreement and 
subsequent sal e were important element s in detent e . 
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These substantial purchases had severe consequenc es in the food and 
feed markets, particularly in the wheat market. They t otalled 
approximately one-half of the United States carryover stocks and over one-
quarter of the 1972 United States production in wheat (Tab le 4 . 1) . The 
major i ty of this was to be transported before the 1973 harvest . The 
purchases put a squeeze on the world wheat market because of the poor 
harvests which ensued in other maJor producing regions of the world 
(Table 4.2) . This caused wheat export prices to increase from Sl.68 during 
the first week of July to over $2.00 in early August to $2.40 in late 
September (Hopkins and Puchala 1978, p . 47) . 
By nego tiating sec retl y and quickly with the individual private grain 
firms, the Soviets avoided the r esul ting price increases which their demand 
caused. The Soviets also took advantage of the United States Department of 
Agriculture ' s export subsidies which had been im plement ed t o reduce 
United States surpluses . 
In spite of these developments, United States decision makers failed 
to alter agricultural policies to compensate for reduced wheat supplies and 
the subsequent price increases. Instead, the programs calling for acreage 
set-asides and export subsidies were left intact . Hence, these 
developments helped, to a certain degree, to stabil i ze the Soviets' food 
sectors whil e destabilizing the United States ' food sectors . 
There were several reasons why these policies were adjusted so s l owly . 
First, United States decision makers did not know how substantial the sales 
were . This was because the private grain firms were not required to r eport 
sales. Secondly, the Soviets had never before purchased grain on such a 
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large scale (Tables 4.3 a nd 4.4) . Thus, United States officials thought 
that the prevailing conditions would r emain only temporary, wh ereby the 
wheat price would stabilize at the low levels of previous yea r s . Plus, the 
sales were accomplishing the goals of Secretary Butz; those goals were to 
expand export sales and increase farm prices . Officials were also hesitant 
t o reverse a policy decision, since many farmers base production and 
marketing decisions on these policies . Since some farmers had already made 
these decisions, policy makers deemed it unwise politically to reverse an 
already set program. 
However, by January 1973, food price inflation was rapid (the 
wholesale price index for food products increased from 125.3 to 132 . 6 
between December and January alone) . The Nixon Administ ration , late t hat 
January, announced plans to r educe set-asides in time for the spring 
plantings. This action coupled with the decision to phase out export 
subs idies, in late September 1972, helped to allay the political pr essure 
which had been developing. 
Once United States officials realized how the Soviets had manipulated 
and exploited the markets, the y attempted t o regulate futu r e sales . This 
was accomplished through export monito r ing and bilater al negotiations. 
These controls on exports were, of course, infuriating to farmers who 
wanted free trade . Consumers, on the other hand, were upset because grain 
exports to the Soviets meant higher domestic food prices . Because of these 
protests, the United States entered into a bilateral agreement with t he 
Soviets in October 1975. 
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The United States entered into the grain agreements for several 
reasons: 1) to prevent any more surprise or secret purchases by the 
Soviets which could possibly deplete United States reserves, in other words 
to stabilize Soviet grain purchases, 2) to prevent another inflationary 
price spiral similar to what occurred in 1972-74 after the first Soviet 
purchases, 3) to initiate a steady and assured export market for United 
States grain, and 4) to encourage the Soviets t o increase their own stocks 
which would help prevent them from reducing world stocks during their own 
production failures. These were the reported intentions . 
However, there is evidence to suggest that the more likel y reasons 
were to appease the farm sector and to divert attention a wa y f r om previous 
agricultural po l icy errors. There are five factors which support these 
reasons . These factors are: 1) based on previous estimates of Soviet 
production and cons1.DI1ption, it was known that the Soviets were in need of 
g rain (Table 4 . 5 and 4.6); 2) even without these agreements the 
United States already supplied the majority of corn on the world market as 
well as almost all of the recent increases in total g rain trade; 3) the 
United States had previously used export embargoes t o combat large 
unexpected Soviet purchases; placing limitations on futur e purchases was a 
defacto embargo ; 4) United States domestic agricultural policy had played a 
major rol e in the price increases since acreage restrictions had no t been 
lifted until 1974 after the price increases were already underway. Also, 
although the USDA was aware of Soviet procurement intentions, they greatly 
underestimated the effect on prices, which was a po litical embarrassment 
(ACLI 1979, pp. 45-46). 
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The Soviets en t e r ed the agr eements for seve ra l r eason s also: 1) t o 
guarantee access to Un ited States grain, 2) t o lessen the need for the 
Soviets t o participat e in a mult ilat eral r eserv e system, and 3) to assure 
adequate feed suppl ies fo r livestock production. 
Soviet Grain Sales and Agreement 1974-1975 
Although not in the Unit ed States grain markets in July 1973 - June 
1974, the Sov ie ts did enter in the fall o f 1974 t o pur chase 107 million 
bushels of g rain and were r eady t o purchase an additional 67 million 
bushels. Sinc e there was a s ligh t shortage of United States grain 
suppl ies, a nd consumer food prices were ri sing , the Ford Administ r a tion 
advised the gra in companies against these additional sales . The 
administration also a s ked that the gra i n companies ob tain app r oval f rom the 
USDA be for e any future sal es in excess of 1.7 million bushel s t ook place t o 
any country. Ford instituted these directives t o appease the consumers and 
the Cong r ess ( who might have demand ed f utur e export controls) even though 
the t o tal amount of whea t and corn asked for by the Soviets amounted to 
just 2% of t o tal United States production. This amount was muc h less than 
the former purchases . 
But by March 1975 , all monitoring of sales were eased (except 
r epo rting r e quirements) as prices declined and the market s s t abilized . 
Sa le s were continued until Secretar y Butz announced a tempo r ary s us pension 
of Soviet gr ain s ales because the March 11 th c r o p projec tion was l ow . 
It was also at thi s time that the maritime unions began t o pro t es t 
agains t the low shipping rates the Sovie t s paid and the low proportion of 
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Uni ted States ships being used to transport the grain . The timing of this 
pr otest was significant, since the end of the United States-Soviet Union 
Maritime agreement was approaching. Then, on August 18, 1975, AFL-CIO 
President George Meany stated that the International Longshoremen's 
Assoc iation would boycott loading g rain ships for the Soviet Union if the 
inter ests of both the consumers and shipping industry were not protected. 
President Ford and Labor Sec retary Dunlop met with Meany and othe r labor 
leaders twice, once on August 26, and then on September 9, to settle on an 
agreement. The unions suspended their boycott fo r a month, and the 
administration stopped new grain sales t o the Soviets until mid - October. 
During this time the Ford Administration consented to try to negotiate with 
the Soviets, guaranteeing a long-term minimum pur chase grain agreement. 
President Ford sent a five-man team t o negotiate, headed by 
Undersecretary of State Charles A. Robinson. This team negotiated and 
signed an agreemen t with the Soviets in October 1975, effective from 
October 1976 until September 30 , 1981, based on an October-September c r op 
year. The agreement was announced by Presid ent Ford on October 20, 1975 . 
Under this five - year grain agreement, the Soviets agreed to import a 
minimum of 198 million bushels of wheat and co rn ( 3 million tons each) 
annually with a maximum of 267 million bushel s. Anything over this amount 
required permission by the United States government. In the event that 
Un i t ed States grain availability fell below 225 million tons in any year, 
sales for that year would cease (USDA Agricultural Situation: USSR 1981 , 
p . 18). All trade which resulted from this agreemen t was covered under the 
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then new United States-Soviet Union Maritime agreement (signed on September 
19, 1975), which also expired in 1981. Sales were also to be handled 
through normal commercial channels (i . e . , multinational grain companies). 
Other provisions of the agreement included: 1) semiannual consultations 
scheduled to discuss the supply and demand situation of both nations, 2) 
" pu r chases were to be made at market prices at the time of purchase in 
accordance with normal commercial terms, 3) the United States would not 
impose export controls on wheat and corn purchased by the Soviets, and 4) 
all wheat and corn purchased by the Soviets would be consumed in the Soviet 
Union" (Talbot 1977, p. 318). 
The Sovie t s had in the past financed a large part of their grain 
purchases by gold sales. During the 1960s and early 1970s , the sale of 
gold could be directl y linked to g rain imports of some magn itude . However, 
this link is not as easily r ecognized now, since the Soviets are also 
gearing gold sales to world spot market prices regardless of grain 
requirements. 
This direct link has also become distorted as the gold- grain pr i ce 
relationship has changed. In the years that gold prices escalated, grain 
became relatively cheape r in terms of gold . Consequent l y , it took less 
gold to purchase the same amount of grain as previously . This means that 
gold sales s hould hav e decreased relative to annual grain imports instead 
of increasing, as they did for the Soviets. 
The Soviets have been financing purchases as of late by negotiating 
long-term cred it agreements and hav e borrowed on the Eurodollar market . 
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They have also at times used oil exports t o earn ha rd curr e ncy to pay for 
imports. 
It is now apparent that the Soviets no longer import g rain in just 
low- pr oduction years. Even in good years the y have been importing in ord er 
to keep livestock product ion in gear in an attempt to meet goals . If the 
Soviets plan on trying t o sustain these goa l s , they must have average 
annual imports of at least 825 million bushels ove r the du r ation of the 
198 1-85 Five-Year Plan, given past tre nd s in gr ain production. United 
States government agencies believe that the Sov i e t s can handle this much 
grain at their ports, since it is estimated that they have an annual impor t 
capacity of approximatel y 1 , 320 mill i on bushels. 
However, even if the Soviets did require this much gr a in and could 
secure it, it would still be difficult t o move the g r ain bec ause of a 
limited amount of transportation and s t orage in the interior . Thus, the 
Soviets have begun t o l ook mor e closely at logistics at domestic 
production when consid e ring when t o pu r chase g rain in o rder to prevent a 
bottleneck a t ports . 
As can be seen in this chapter , the multinational grain firms play an 
important r ole in the internationa l political-economic sphere. To a 
deg r ee , the r es ult of their sec r e t negotiations with the Sovie ts led to 
event s which fo rced the United States government to ne~o t iate the gr ain 
agreements a l ong with impl ementing the export r eporting polic y . The grain 
firms do , indeed, play a major r ole in international affair s . Exactly what 
their r ole is and how they play it i s the subjec t of the next cha pter . 
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Table 4 . 1 United States Wheat Production and Carryover (million bushels)a 
Production 
Carryover 
1970 
1352 
984 
1971 
1618 
822 
1972 
1545 
985 
1973 
1705 
599 
aChicago Board of Trade Statistical Annual 1980 . 
Table 4.2 World Wheat Production (million bushels )a 
1970 1971 1972 1973 
Canada 331. 5 523.7 533 . 3 628.8 
Argentina 156.2 191.1 249. 9 213 .1 
Brazil 63 . 6 73 . 5 25 70. 2 
EEC 1,08 7. 6 1,257 . 7 1, 513 . 1 1,509.8 
Australia 289.9 306.6 239.2 400.5 
World Total 10,573 11,496.2 12,164 13,347.6 
1974 
1796 
339 
19 74 
488 . 5 
211 . 3 
103 . 6 
1,661.7 
413.3 
12 , 869 . 5 
aChicago Board of Trade Statistical Annuals: 1970-1976 . 
1975 
2112 
430 
19 75 
624 . 6 
282 . 9 
91. 9 
1,417.3 
404 . 2 
13,055 . l 
Table 4.3 
a 
Soviet Grain Trade 
1967 1968 
Wheat : 
b 
Imports 1.4 . 2 
Exports 5 . 3 5 . 8 
(Net) (+3.9) (+5.6) 
Coarse Grains: 
Imports . 4 . 5 
Exports . 7 .9 
(Net) ( +.3) (+ . 4) 
Total: 
c 
Imports l. 8 . 7 
Exports 6 . 0 6.7 
(Net) (+4.2) (+6.0) 
1969 1970 
1.1 . 5 
6 . 4 7. 2 
(+5. '3) ( +6 . 7) 
• L .3 
. 9 .9 
(+.8) (+ . 6) 
1. 2 .8 
7.3 8. 1 
( +6. 1) (+7 .3 ) 
aJuly-June year, in million metric tons . 
blncl . wheat eq uivale nt of flour . 
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 
3 . 4 15.6 4.5 2. 5 10. 1 
5.8 1.3 5 .0 4.0 . 5 
(+2.4) (-14.3) (+.5) (+1.5) (-9 . 6) 
4.3 6.9 6.4 2 . 7 15 . 6 
. 7 .4 .9 1.0 
(-3.6) (-6 .5) (-5. 5) (-1. 7) (-15.6) 
7. 7 22 . 5 10.9 5.2 25.7 
6.5 l. 7 5.9 5.0 . 5 
(+1.2) (-20 . 8) (-5 . 0) (-0.2) (-25 . 2) 
c 
Total grains here refer to wheat and coarse grains only , excluding an insignificant 
amount of trade in miscellaneous grains, paddy rice and/or buckwheat, which amounts to less than 
1/2 million tons annually. 
O" 
.t:'-
a 
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Table 4.4 U. S. Shipments as % of Total Sovie t Imports 
Wheat Corn To t a l Grains 
1971 0 55 14 
1972 33 76 46.4 
1973 57 77 64.4 
1974 41 59 57.7 
19 75 45 58 44 . 6 
ACLI Commodity Services: 1979 
Table 4 . 5 . Changes in Soviet Total Grain Production 
1967 
%-1 3 . 6 
1969 
- 4 . 2 
1971 
- 3 . 0 
1972 
-7.2 
1974 
-12 . 1 
1975 
- 28.4 
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Table 4.6 . Sovi et Wheat Acreage , Yi eld and Production ( in mill i on 
acres, bushels / acre, million bushets)a 
1966-70 
Production average 1971 1972 1973 1974 
Winter Wheat 
Area 45.1 51. l 37 . 0 45 . 3 45 . 9 
Yield 29 . 1 34 . 3 29. l 40 . 1 35 . 7 
Production 1318 1755 1079 1816 1642 
Spring Wheat 
Ar ea 121 107 107 . 5 110 . 7 10 l. 5 
Yield 16 .5 17.5 19.3 20 . 0 14 . 5 
Production 1995 1873 2080 2217 1440 
Total Wheat 
Area 166 .1 158 . 1 144.5 156 147 . 4 
Yield 19.9 22.9 21.8 25.8 20 . 8 
Production 3313 3028 3159 4033 3082 
1975 
48.4 
27 . 8 
1346 
104 . 7 
10 . 4 
1086 
153.1 
15 . 9 
2432 
Soviet Corn Ac reage , Yi eld & Pr oduct ion 
( in million ac r es , bushels / acre, million bushels) 
Ar ea 8 . 7 8 . 2 9.9 9 . 9 9 . 8 6.5 
Yield 43.3 41.0 38 . 8 52 . 2 48 . 5 43 . 6 
Production 376 338 387 520 476 288 
a 
ACLI Commodity Se rvices: 1979 . 
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CHAPTER V. THE STRUCTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL GRAIN MARKETING SYSTEM 
It is readily apparent that any study of the political-economic rela-
tions of two major grain- trading countries and their agriculture could not 
be undertaken without understanding the structure of the international 
grain marketing system and the actors and their roles. The actors in this 
system relevant to this study, aside from the United States and Soviet 
Union governments, are the five major multinational g rain firms and the 
other major grain-trading countries, which include Canada, Australia, the 
European Economic Community (EEC), Argentina, and Brazi l . 
The structure and performance of the multinational grain firms provide 
perhaps the most complex component of the international grain ma r keting 
system. The extent and range of operations and holdings of these firms 
makes it virtually impossible for them all to be excluded when agricultural 
trade materializes between two countries. Together these companies handle 
approximately 90% of the United States' grain exports and 70% of the 
world ' s grain exports (Freivalds 1976, p. 116). 
The five large grain firms - Car gil l, Continental , Bunge, Dreyfus , and 
Andre (the last three are foreign-owned or controlled) - and mos t of their 
subsidiaries are private-family- owned and operated multiproduct, multi-
national, and multi-billion-dollar corporations . Since they are privately 
held, they are not required to file with the federal Securities and 
Exchange Commission. This allows them to be relatively free of public 
scrutiny. 
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These five companies - here after referred to as Rig Gr ain - no t only 
own the traditional facilities in gr ain trade ( i.e., te rmina ls , rail, 
trucking, barges , and ships), but they also own fe ed manufacturing pl ant s , 
seed companies , o ilseed proc ess ing plants, milling plants , agri-research 
facilities , hatcheries, ranches, and farms (Appe ndix I con tains a partial 
listing of their holdings) . Because of the cyclical nature of agriculture 
and the resulting fluctuations in profits, Big Grain has begun to dive r sify 
their opera tion s by acquiring banks, r estaurant s , insurance companies, 
lumber facilit ies , and steel manufacturing pl an ts to name a fe w. This 
diversification has allowed Big Grain to strengt hen their position in grain 
trade even mor e , since a loss in trading can be offset b y a profit 
e lse where . Likewise , a loss in another oper ation can be offset by a profit 
in grain . The magnitud e of these holdings and high market concen tration 
provides Big Grain with o l i gopsonist ic market power (fe w buyers pur chas i ng 
from a large number of seller s). 
Of course, although being highly concent r a t ed is a major facto r, it is 
not the exclusive reason f or possessing market power . There are o t he r 
indicator s as well. The two principal reasons why on l y a few companies 
dominate the g rain trade are: 1) the substantial economies of size in the 
physical operations and in trad i ng on international markets; and 2) the 
information network they have developed allowing them to be privy to 
virtually an y factor which could influe nce g r ain trade. 
"The more there i s specialized knowledge and inside information 
about prices, sales, cos t s , and profits, both pr esent and fu t ur e, 
within an indus try or g r oup o f firms, compar ed to r ela t ive 
i gnorance and uncertainty outside, the more can insiders be 
e xpected to use thi s effect ively in developing and maintaining 
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market power .. . it is also true for monopoly positions which might 
be subject to intrusion of outsiders if they had more informa-
tion" (Sheperd 1970, p. 34). 
These firms are structured virtually identically with sales offices 
and agents located domestically and around the world . Their complex com-
munications systems link these offices together providing information on 
buy-and-sell orders, deals, crop conditions, and political events. These 
information networks are only surpassed by the United States Department of 
Agriculture and the Central Intelligence Agency . Also, Big Grain is in a 
good position to utilize their information, since the United States relies 
on them, instead of a centralized board, to handle the grain trade . 
Not only this, but there are in some cases working r elationships 
between officers and directors of different grain companies. Many of them 
belong to the same trade associations (e . g . , Terminal Elevator Grain 
Merchants Association, North American Export Grain Association, National 
Grain Trade Council) or are board members together at companies outside of, 
but still essential to, the grain trade, such as banks o r insurance 
companies. Big Grain has also been known to hire ex-ll . S . D.A. official s 
once their admi nistration ' s term is over. The most notorious example was 
when former Assistant Secretary of Agriculture Cl arence Palmby was hi r ed by 
Continental Grain. Palmby he lped negotiate the 1972 Soviet g ra in sales of 
which Continental was the largest se l ler . This 11 fraternization" among and 
between these compani es a ll ows them to trade and utilize information and 
resources to which others may not have access . 
As mentioned previously, the substantial economies of size in terms of 
Big Grain ' s operations and holdings is also instrumen tal in exerting market 
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power . A brief synopsis of the individual holdings of each will allow one 
to better comprehend how economies of size can lead to market power . 
(Since these companies do not make their operations and holdings 
public, it is difficult to estimate what exactly the totals are. The 
figures given below do not include those for facilities leased or rented, 
nor does it include operations unrelated to the grain trade.) 
Cargill 
Cargill, based in Minneapolis, Minnesota, is the largest grain firm in 
the world with total sales approaching $30 billion (WSJ, May 7, 1982). 
This would place Cargill in the top ten of Fortune's top 500 corporations. 
It has operations ln 250 North American locations and in 36 foreign 
countries employing over 12,000 people. Cargill has elevators in 60 
locations with a total storage capacity of 180 million bushels. Cargill 
moves this grain with a 1000-unit fleet of covered hopper rail cars, 
hundreds of trucks, and 44 barges . Once the grain reaches one of twelve 
export terminals located on all seacoasts of North America and the Great 
Lakes, it is transported on Car gill ' s eleven ships, registered in Liberia 
and Peru, to foreign ports. Cargill also owns feed-manufacturing and 
oilseed- processing plants in the United States and Europe. It has 35 feed 
plants in the United States and more than 20 in Europe with 14 and three 
oilseed plants in those locations respectively . Research is done in nine 
countries at 29 locations. 
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Continental 
Continental, owned by Michel Fribourg, lS headquartered in 
New York City and Geneva, Switzerland. It employs over 3,000 people with 
sales of approximately $5 billion. Continental has grain elevators all 
across North America. Grain is transported to and from these elevators on 
approximately 370 rail cars and 65 barges to export terminals with t o tal 
storage capacity of three million tons. Storage capacity abroad totals 
approximately 500 , 000 tons. Continental ' s processing is done by Allied 
Mills, which was purchased in 1966 . Al lied processes both feed grains and 
oilseeds. 
Bunge 
Bunge is headquartered ln Buenos Aires , Argentina , with domestic head-
quarters in New York City . It has sales of around $2 billion and empl oys 
1,200 people with offices in 80 foreign nations . Bunge operates 100 
country elevators in the United States along with 22 river, five interior-
rail, and fou r port terminals with storage of around 100 million bushels . 
It moves its grain with 105 barges and 75 , 000 rail cars all located in the 
United States (Hamilton 1972, p. 29). 
Dreyfus 
Dreyfus has domestic headquarters in New York City but has its main 
headquarters in Paris. Its United St ates e l evator storage ca pacity totals 
approximately e leven million bushels, and it operat es 13 ships char tered 
under French and British flags. 
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Andre 
Andre is a Swiss company located in Geneva with Lts American affili-
ate, Gannac , being located in New York City. Very little is known about 
Andre's o perations except that it specializes in financing g rain deals by 
unconventional methods . Andre deals mostly with eastern European and Third 
World countries through compensation, barter, triangular contracts , switch 
financing, and cooperation transactions. "Thi s might involve shipping 
Swedish precision tool s to Rumania in return for a shipment of canned meat, 
which is then sold to an Indonesian importe r against payment in convertible 
guilders in a Dutch bank" (Morgan 1980a, p . 178). 
Big Grain firms utilize their vast world-wide holdings to avoid high 
taxation, foreign exchange regulations, and export controls which hinder 
the operations of smaller na tional companies. They do this by trading 
grain indirectly through a third party subsidiary to circumvent these 
restrictions to the utmost . 
An example will serve to clarify how one multinational could manipu-
late its trade s to its advantage. Suppose Cargi l l sold a shipload of soy-
beans for future delivery to a Dutch pr ocessor . Cargill would physically 
move the beans from its inland elevators to the Mississippi River, where 
they would be shipped to Baton Rouge, Louisiana . The beans would then be 
loaded onto a cargo vessel bound for Rotterdam, The Netherlands. This 
transaction could have transpired with relative ease assuming it was 
operating under the concep t of ceteris paribus. Unfortunat ely , this is not 
the case. The market and the conditions it operates under are in a con-
stant state of fluctuation. Trade regulations, political-economic 
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relations and events, and prices are always changing , forcing the multi-
nationals to adjust their trading strategies accordingly . If the politi-
cal - economic atmosphere between the United States and the Dutch changed so 
that the United States placed trade sanctions on The Netherlands, the 
multinationals, if they elected to do so, could adapt to mitigate the 
effects of these changes. 
Cargill, for this specific example, could offset the effects of the 
embar go or trade sanction by selling the soybeans to its subsidiary , 
Tradax/Panama, which would then hire Tradax /Geneva as its agent. 
Tradax/Geneva would then finalize the sa l e through Tradax /The Netherlands 
by having them arrange t o sell Tradax/ Panama's soybeans to the Dutch 
processor. Tradax/Panama, a tax- haven company, would receive the profits, 
and Tradax/ Geneva would earn a management fee for b r okering the deal . Of 
course, this would only involve the title to the grain and not the physical 
commodity. This means that Cargill cannot onl y guard its profits against 
United States taxes, but it also has the capability to minimize the effects 
of trade sanctions pl aced on any country by the United States government . 
However, Cargill not only must guard its transaction with the Dutch 
against changes in trade regulations and political - economic conditions , but 
also against price changes. Cargill could lock in a profit by purchasing 
soybean futures contracts the next da y (if prices were low enough to insure 
a profitable transaction) on the Chicago Board of Trade. They could have 
done this t o guard against a price increase befor e the soybeans actually 
had to be purchased and delivered . But Car gill may not be able to accom-
plish this if the CBT markets increased rapidly enough and eliminated the 
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profit margin before all of the contracts could be purchased. Instead, 
Cargill, again through its Geneva office, would purchase soybean meal and 
oil from European processors , or sunflower seeds o r rapeseeds from eastern 
Europe to "cover" its sale (sunflower seed and rapeseed prices respond in a 
similar manner to soybean prices). When Cargill actually purchased the 
soybeans, it would then sell whatever product it purchased to offset any 
loss which may possibly have acc rued between the time the soybeans were 
contracted for and actuall y delivered to Rotterdam. 
Another reason Cargill may not contract for an offsetting position on 
Uni ted States futures markets is because the position would have to be 
reported, as well as be under the auspices of , the regulation s set by the 
exchanges. Consequently, the multinationals resort to offsetting their 
cash trades by the above-mentioned practices . The multinationals and 
others involved in grain trade have also instituted their own private 
"futures" market. They have accomplished this by trading the rights t o the 
cargo while the ships were at sea. These ships carry cargo of between 
15,000 and 20,000 tons of grain . Several advantages o f thse private 
"futures" markets are that no margin money is required; trading is done by 
word of mouth instead of by formalized contract, and, of course, t hese 
transactions are never reported. 
Rig Grain is not the only ac tor in the inte rna tional g rain marke ting 
system. As mentioned previously, the major grain-exporting countries 
(Canada, Australia, the EEC, Argent ina, and Brazil) also are infl uential. 
Of the major grain-exporting countries, the United States (Table 5 . 1) 
is the only one which does not operate through some type of cen tralized 
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marketing board. In most instances, these boards are the sole authority to 
move grain. This is also true of the major importers . Japan, the 
Soviet Union, and China all have some type of centralized agency which 
handles all grain movement. This is true fo r many developing nations as 
well, including India and Bangladesh. 
Of the trading done by the exporting countries , Big Grain handles 
approximately 90% of the movement. 
As with the multinationals, a descriptive synopsis of the functions of 
the exporting countries will serve to better clarify how the international 
grain-marke ting system functions . 
Canada 
Canada uses a grain-mar keting board, the Canadian Wheat Board , to 
cont rol wheat movement. It has the authority to buy a nd sell whenever and 
wherever it chooses at whatever price it decides upon, with the objective 
of maximizing producers' returns . Producers retain possession of the grain 
until it is called for by the Board. Since the Board does not own export-
ing or storage facilities, it cont racts with private firms or sells to Big 
Grain. 
Payment to producers is divided into two stages. Producers receive a 
partial paymen t from the country elevators on behalf of the Board after the 
year ' s harvest is delivered . Sales proceeds, minus costs, are given to the 
producers in the form of a final paymen t after the wheat is sold. The 
justification for having a board is that the volume of wheat handled 
results in economies of scale when moving and selling on both the domestic 
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and international markets. Table 5 .2 presents data on Canadian g r ain 
t r ade . 
Australia 
Austral ia also has a whea t board, which functions in a s imilar manner 
t o Canada ' s board. The Board pools the wheat into bulk handling facili-
ties, which are provided by state sanctioned coope ratives . The Board sell s 
this grain directly to domest ic users o r t o the Australian government for 
use in food programs . All surplus wheat is so l d to fo r eign governments and 
to international commercial g r ain traders. Prices ar e negotiated based on 
the c urrent market conditions. 
The Australian governmen t tries to influence the supply of wheat by 
o ffe ring subsidy payment s for fertilize r use and rail transporta tion . 
The effect of these subsidies and pr eferential rates is to increase the 
amount of whea t availab le fo r export at any given price (Jones and 
Thompson 1978 , p. 39). Table 5 . 3 pr esent s da t a on Australian g rain 
trade . 
Argentina 
Up until March of 1976, the Argentine government maintained low food 
pr ices by way o f mar ket a nd price cont r o ls. Ho wever, after April of 1976 , 
their policies we r e completely reversed t o encour age product ion. This was 
do ne by decontrolling domestic prices , raising suppor t l ev els to more 
close l y r eflect world levels, r e turning both domes tic a nd fo r eign marketing 
t o the privat e sec tor, and by increasing the amount of c r edit available to 
cover pr oduction cost s a nd increase s t o r age capacity . Foreign trade was 
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encouraged by r educing expo rt taxes and by periodically devaluing the peso . 
Table 5 .4 presents data on Argentinian g rain trade . 
Brazil 
Brazil has established itself as a majo r force in the soybean market. 
Since 1968 the gove rnment has e ncouraged soybean mea l and o il exports 
through favorable tax and subsidy policies. Soybeans , on the other hand, 
have been subject to taxes and export embargoes . Soybean production has 
also increased because of the Brazilian wheat polic y . The gove r nment sup-
ports wheat production at high level s t o inc r ease self-sufficiency, which 
in turn increases soybean prod uction. This is because t hese two commodi-
ties a r e double c r opped . Double c ropping is done to spread c apita l cos t s 
between the two. Table 5.5 presents data on Brazilian grain trade. 
The European Economic Community ( EEC ) 
Grain trade to and from the EEC is influenced by the Common 
Agricultural Polic y (CAP), which was devised to r egula te all of agricul-
ture. 
To insure an adequate income f or the farm sector , t he EEC uses a sys-
tem o f support prices. The three main prices are the target price, the 
intervention price, and the thresho ld price . The target price is announced 
each August for the following c r op year and is cal culated using the cos t of 
production for the greatest deficit reg ion in the EEC. The interven tion 
price is the price at which either the commodity must be bought by the EEC 
agency or private storage mus t be paid for . This price is s e t at a certain 
perc entage below the target price . The commodity sold at this price 
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results from the surplus production which occurs because of a target price 
set above the world equilibrium price . 
Since the target price is set above the world equilibrium price, world 
producers want to export commodities into the EEC. To combat these 
increased exports, the EEC uses an import quota or duty in the form of a 
variable levy and threshold price. 
The threshold price is the import price at Rotterdam and is equal to 
the target price minus the cost of transport to t he final destination. A 
variable levy is paid to make up the difference between the thr eshold price 
and import price. It is variable, because it is calculated and r eset 
daily . If the world price ever exceeds the target price, there is, of 
course, no levy for that period. The EEC can also impose an export tax to 
prevent the domestic price from exceeding the target price. With this 
system, the domestic markets are protected from the daily fluctuations in 
the world market and are more stable. 
Because of the secure domestic market and an absence of programs for 
supply management, the EEC has accumulated surpl uses in various 
commodities. Some of the surplus has been moved onto the world market 
through the use of export subsidies. The export subsidy is the difference 
between the intervention price and the world price. The EEC also 
intervenes in the market by purchasing and storing var ious commodities . 
Table 5.6 presents data on EEC grain trade. 
The significance of the major grain-trading countries' protectionist 
policies and relatively closed markets which r esult lies in the effect they 
have on the international grain markets. This is true for both expor ters 
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and importers. These major grain-trading countries use these protectionist 
policies to capitalize on the actions taken by countries operating under a 
relatively free market system such as the United States does. Big Grain, 
motivated by profit, is also free to do the same. This will be demon-
s trated in the following chapte rs. 
Table 5.1. United States 
a 
1970 1971 197 2 1973 1974 
Production 
(1000 MT) 
corn 105,463 143,290 141,053 143,435 118 ,461 
soybeans 30,675 32,006 34,916 42' 108 33,062 
wheat 36,784 44,030 42,043 46,408 48,885 
Imports: 
(MT) 
corn 83,669 49,952 31,151 31,791 30,085 
soybeans 28 25 61 310 34 
wheat 43, 141 9,596 2,845 3,932 82,846 
Exports: 
(MT) 
corn 14,401,580 12,884,201 22,386,479 33,196,095 29,867,590 
soybeans 11,839,087 11,521,008 11,992,812 13 ,22 2,176 13,940,037 
wheat 19,084,701 17,535,941 22, 611, 919 38,444,883 26,046,085 
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1975 1976 1977 
148,487 159 ,172 163 , 213 
41 , 406 35,042 47,948 
58,074 58,307 55,420 
44 , 558 46 , 328 66,546 
42 3 , 508 76 
17,145 22,613 35,201 
33 , 502 , 718 44,295 , 829 40,481,219 
12,496,454 15 , 332 , 382 16,196,069 
38 ,293,7 25 27,551,614 25 ,224 ,486 
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1978 
179,886 
50 , 149 
48,954 
50 '961 
69 
612 
50 , 142 , 307 
20,709,887 
35,502,918 
1979 1980 
20 1, 655 168,855 
61 , 723 49,454 
58,080 64 ,492 
34,468 23,311 
269 6 , 000 
5,063 5,774 
59 , 242,457 63 , 152 , 310 
20 ,904,582 21,786,457 
34 , 703,311 36 , 861 , 680 
Table 5.2 . Canada 
a 
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 
Pr oduction 
( 1000 MT) 
corn 2 ,564 2,946 2,657 2, 803 2, 577 
soybe ans 283 280 320 397 280 
wheat 9,023 14 , 412 14,514 16,159 13 , 29 5 
Imports : 
(MT) 
corn 463,338 199,426 416, 760 793,185 1,289,944 
soybeans 442, 404 424,652 308 , 481 23 1, 787 390 , 781 
wheat 344 
Export s : 
(MT) 
corn 2,947 33,963 22 , 891 11'902 6 , 24 1 
soybeans 28 ,5 76 34,034 41,546 27,051 13,067 
wheat 11,493,715 13,635 ,289 14,633,091 12 ,906,112 10,627 ,577 
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19 75 
3,623 
367 
17,078 
773, 11 6 
385,097 
4,288 
8,710 
11,647, 722 
19 76 
3, 771 
250 
23,587 
791 , 436 
397 ,463 
330, 109 
24 , 646 
11, 221,535 
1977 
4, 196 
527 
19,862 
556,798 
317,970 
98' 717 
38 ,1 09 
15,511,313 
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1978 
4,215 
475 
21,146 
425,514 
324,445 
407,713 
83,307 
15,337,790 
19'79 
4,983 
672 
17,185 
814,216 
351,092 
171,181 
46 , 919 
12,47 0 ,682 
1980 
5,462 
713 
19, 131 
1,204,650 
477 , 071 
748,889 
95,754 
17,359,729 
Table 5.3. Australia 
a 
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 
Production 
( 1000 MT) 
corn 192 212 214 139 106 
soybeans 6 9 26 38 63 
wheat 7, 890 8 , 510 6 , 613 11, 902 10,833 
Imports: 
(MT) 
corn 513 434 566 605 800 
soybeans 703 10,755 264 7 42 , 000 
wheat 29 28 19 32 14 
Expor ts: 
(HT) 
corn 632 22 ,374 38,467 9 ,1 91 2 , 800 
soybeans 4 43 129 1, 209 1, 200 
whea t 7,309 , 961 9,483,685 8,712,256 5,627,346 5,329 , 286 
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1975 
139 
64 
11 , 732 
1,189 
16, 032 
21 
1,272 
3,723 
8 , 200,507 
19 76 
131 
45 
11,667 
600 
7,300 
21 
10, 820 
32,000 
7,882,421 
1977 
144 
55 
9,370 
2, 100 
7.1 ,176 
133 
3,300 
100 
8 ,181,195 
85 
19 78 
130 
77 
18,300 
2,700 
14, 502 
32 
11,100 
8 
11, 134, 031 
1979 
169 
99 
15 , 697 
3,040 
2 
57 
16,866 
473 
6 , 931, 140 
1980 
127 
89 
10,800 
4,010 
13,003 
32 
7,702 
141 
14 ,95 5, 305 
Table 5.4 . Ar gentina 
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 
Production 
( 1000 MT) 
cor n 9 , 360 9,930 5 , 860 9 , 700 9 , 900 
soybeans 27 59 78 272 496 
wheat 4,920 5,680 8,100 9, 967 10,647 
Impo r ts: 
(MT) 
corn 182 601 51 31 31 
soybeans 3 34 585 198 
whea t 2 27 25 422 , 066 
Expo rt s: 
(MT) 
corn 5 , 232 , 847 6,128,393 3,005,182 4,032,708 5,600 , 000 
soybeans 
wheat 2,415,066 987,218 1,783,783 3,108,618 1 , 962,430 
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1975 
7,700 
485 
11,913 
7 
2 
1976 
5,855 
695 
11 , 000 
1977 
8 ,300 
1,400 
5,300 
23 
120 
87 
1978 
9 , 700 
2,500 
8' 100 
12 
2,640 
1979 
8,700 
3,700 
8, 100 
4 , 183 
1980 
6,410 
3,500 
7,830 
3 , 886,982 3,080,350 5,430 , 728 5,895,312 5,959,011 3 , 524 , 660 
17 62,600 612,833 1,982,862 2,809,787 2,709,420 
1,920,003 3,264,373 5 , 969 ,1 71 1 , 776,188 4 , 390 ,390 4,620,180 
Table 5 . 5. 
. a 
Braz i.l 
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 
Production 
(1000 MT) 
corn 14,216 14,307 14,500 14, 109 17,284 
soybeans 1,509 1,977 3,500 5,012 7,876 
wheat 1,844 2,132 800 2,031 2,859 
Imports: 
(MT) 
corn 2, 110 1,180 2,141 4,251 
soybeans 3 1, 274 5,203 4,813 20,000 
wheat 1,993,556 1, 739 ,164 1,811,458 2 ,960, 026 2,406,142 
Exports: 
(MT) 
corn 1,470,620 1,279,696 122 , 074 41,013 1,102,885 
soybeans 289,623 213,426 1,037,273 1,786,138 2,724,068 
wheat 33 
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1975 
16,491 
10,200 
1, 500 
2, 073 
194 
2 ,1 06 ,490 
1,147,941 
3,333,334 
99 
1976 
17, 845 
11, 227 
3,215 
2,100 
200 
3 ,435 , 049 
1,371,733 
3,639,497 
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1977 1978 
19,246 13 , 533 
12, 513 9,800 
2,066 2 ,677 
579 1, 262 , 132 
89 , 369 
2 ,6 25,992 4 , 335 , 381 
1,420 ,037 14,632 
2 ,586 , 866 658 , 500 
1979 
16,309 
10,235 
2,927 
1,525 , 930 
213 ,4 74 
3,658 , 337 
9 , 917 
638 , 466 
842 
1980 
20 ,377 
15 ,1 33 
2 , 614 
1,594,080 
460,595 
4,758,501 
6,042 
1 , 548 , 883 
Table 5. 6 . EEC a 
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 
Production 
(looo MT) 
corn 12, 867 14 ' 122 14,008 16,392 14,483 
soybeans 5 4 5 26 53 
wheat 34,807 40 , 058 31,992 41 , 452 49 , 815 
Imports: 
(MT) 
corn 14,621,384 15,804 , 374 16,061,674 15 ,635, 632 18 ,1 05 , 798 
soybeans 5,248,192 5,776 , 203 6,531 ,1 22 7 ,118,783 9 , 115 , 063 
wheat 11,785 , 560 11,094,997 11, 606 '954 8 , 595 , 829 10 , 095 , 467 
Export s: 
(MT ) 
corn 3 ,5 78 , 053 5 , 233 ,968 4,570, 180 5 ,333,543 5 , 683,292 
soybeans 18,414 16, 580 268 , 592 112, 634 15 , 700 
wheat 9,091 , 514 6,763,215 9 , 489,004 11 , 959 , 810 11 , 225,304 
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1975 
13,950 
30 
38' 116 
18,203 , 917 
8 , 233 ,451 
10,953,920 
5 , 603 , 976 
110 ' 458 
13 , 381 , 847 
19 76 
11, 463 
56 
39,526 
20 , 927 , 737 
9,212,565 
11. 261, 511 
5 ,4 13,784 
193 , 866 
12 , 998 , 919 
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1977 1978 
15,577 16,1 72 
78 86 
38 , 499 47 , 134 
19,905,270 17 ,11 5 ,143 
9 , 137 ,123 10,394 , 678 
10,732,091 10 ,134,529 
4 ,1 22 , 335 4 , 689 , 249 
120,223 237,059 
14,849,042 14,592 , 907 
1979 
17 , 266 
107 
46 , 464 
12,823 , 119 
12,015 , 397 
10 , 513,225 
5 , 023 , 641 
352 , 365 
15 , 136,832 
1980 
16,425 
111 
51,904 
14, 636 , 704 
12,029,202 
10 , 827,968 
5 ,198 ,253 
326 , 379 
13, 348 , 906 
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CHAPTER VI . THE GRAIN EMBARGOES 
An embargo is defined as "an order of a government prohibiting the 
departure of commercial ships from its ports." This general definition 
recognizes that all embargoes are not alike. The circumstances and events 
that lead to a particular embargo may be unique . This leads one to make 
specific distinctions between different types of embargoes . Josling has 
made the following five distinctions: 
"l ) a general export embargo on trade with all countrie s for a 
particular commodity or a specific export embar go on sales to one 
country; 2) a unilat e ral embargo, by one exporter or a coopera-
tive embar go , by a g r oup of exporters; 3) an embar go in a surplus 
situation - for presumably political reasons or an embargo in a 
shortage situation - usually for economic reasons; 4) an embar go 
on a developed country trade flow or an embargo on a developing 
country trade flow; 5) an emba r go on a small count r y (in terms 
of imports) or an embargo on a large country" (Jos ling 1981, 
p . l). 
Various facets of these individual distinctions can be merged to crea te 
more elaborate o r complex pictures of embargoes. An example would be a 
unilateral emba rgo on a large developed count r y resulting from a shortage 
of a specific conunodity. This is just one of many possible combinations 
which could occur . These combinations lead to numerous effects and reac-
tions in both the domestic and international arenas, the significance of 
which will be demonstrated in the fo llowing chapte r when the condi tions for 
increasing the probability of success or failu r e of an embargo are 
studied. 
The utilization of embargoes as political-economic tools is not a 
recent happening but has occurr ed throughout history. Several examples 
which have occurred in thi s centur y are the League of Nations' iq35 call 
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for an embargo against Italy after that country invaded Ethiopia, the 
United States' use of embargoes against communist countries at various 
times since 1949 to mitigate communist military capability, and the 1973 
Arabian oil and petrolewn ex porting countries (OPEC) embargo on oil exports 
to the United States and The Netherlands to demonstrate Arabian animosity 
towards those countries for their pro-Israeli stance . 
As stated previously in Chapte r IV, the Soviets had entered the 
United States grain markets quite d ramat ically during the early 1970s. 
These large purchases eventually caused the United States government to 
take two actions; the first was an embargo on soybean exports in June of 
1973 to prevent further large purchases during a short supply , and the 
second was negotiation of a gr ain trade agreement with the Soviets . 
However, the seeming dependence of the Soviets on United States g rain 
appeared to c r eate a new avenue of management for the United States when 
dealing with the Soviets in the international arena . This was, of course , 
to use grain as a political-economic bargaining tool during times of c r ises 
o r confrontation. How the United States attempted to do this will be 
demonstrated during the examination of the embargoes . Those embargoes 
occurred during August of 1975 against the Soviet Union and Poland, dur ing 
January of 1980 again against the Soviets, and as jus t mentioned during 
June of 1973 on all soybean exports . 
The June 1973 Soybean Embargo 
The Soviet g ra in sa l es of 1972 had depleted the United States reserves 
to such an extent that the Nixon Administration in 1973 implemented an 
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agricultural policy which called for fu ll plantings. This was a reversal 
of the past policy which called for holding land out of pr oduction . During 
1973 both foreign and domestic demand for g rains and oilseeds had been 
increasing , while the supply of soybeans and related food and feedstuffs 
such as fish meal and peanut meal had been decreasing (Table 6.1) . The 
demand came primarily from the Communist Bloc coun tr ies, China, Japan, and 
Western Europe (Table 6.2). These countries relied quite heavily on the 
United States for soybeans; Japan, in particular, received almost all of 
its soybeans from the United States. Demand, at this particular time, was 
unusually high because of a decline in the export s of Peruvian fish meal 
and Indian and Senegalese peanut meal. This, coupled with the fact that 
the Brazilian soybean crop wa s below average, forced the importing coun-
tries to look towards the United States to make up the difference . 
This increase in demand resulted in record soybean exports, which drew 
down stocks in September 1972 to just 72 million bushels (Destler 1980, 
p. 51). Soybean and soybean-meal prices began to rise, which increased the 
cost of meat production and consequently an increase in r etail meat prices. 
This induced consl..llllers to form meat boycotts which were a political 
embarrassmen t fo r the Nixon Administration, since it had just lifted many 
of the price controls which had previously been installed . 
The Administration a ttempted to control the resulting inflation on 
June 13 by instituting a sixty-day price freeze on all goods except raw 
agricultural commodities. So that the increasing export demand for these 
raw agricultural products did not create a domestic shor tage and increase 
prices, which would hurt United States livestock produce rs even more, the 
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Administration decided to implement a soybean embargo. This embargo was 
declared on June 27 by Secretary of Commerce Frederick Dent. The decision 
was made despite protests from the USDA, particularly from Secretary Earl 
Butz, and from farm groups who feared that the United States would lose 
established markets as importers found alternative suppliers . The primary 
concern was loss of the Japanese market, since Japan was a leading importer 
of United States soybeans . Secre tary Butz believed that the action was 
taken, despite the protests, because of the domestic pressure which was 
mounting concerning the dramatic rise in food and feed costs. Food prices 
as measured by the Constnner Price Index increased from 126.0 in December 
1972 to 149.4 in August 1973 (Destler 1980, p. 50) . The Administ r ation 
wanted to take measures before the domestic pressure forced Congress into 
initiating mandatory export controls. 
The embargo not only upset United States soybean farmers, but the 
governments of Europe and Japan as well. It forced these governments to 
question not only the dependability of the United States as a supplier, but 
also to what extent the Uni ted States would consider the fate of its allies 
when making political-economic decisions. 
The embargo was eventually lifted in late summer after it was evident 
that the 1973 soybean c rop was go ing to be a r ecord . Within six weeks 
after the June high of Sl2.90/bushel, soybean prices dropped to $6 .40 , and 
exports increased to r ecord levels. 
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Model Determination 
It is ev iden t that the Nixon Administrat i on implemented the soybean 
embargo f or domestic political reasons . Even t hough h e had just been r e-
e lec ted by one of the larges t margins ever, Presiden t Nixon was fac ing 
strong political pressure t o kee p inflation in check. Not onl y were 
livestock pr oduce rs concerned with ri sing feed cos t s , soybean pr ices 
increased f r om $3 . 95 /b ushel in Decembe r 1972 t o $12 . 90 in June and soybean 
meal went from $8 . 67 per 100 pounds to $18 . 75 , but housewives were 
concerned with high food costs (nestle r, 1980. p. 51) . Both the House and 
Senate we r e calling for a pr ice freeze . Labor Secretary John Dunlop was 
also pr essur ing the Pr esident for action , because he was fearful that 
increasing f ood costs would result in labor unions demanding pay raises 
which would worsen the existing inflation . At the same time , these 
problems were be ing magnified by the Wa t e rga te epi sode , wh ich was beginning 
to unfold . 
Consequently , Pr esident Nixon and his adviso r s decided to impose a 
price freeze on goods , which eventually led to the soybean embargo . Such a 
d r amatic policy decision , they hoped, would return some of the President's 
credib ility and appea r ance of autho r ity wh ich may have been lost . 
Although the soybean emb ar go did not coincide with a n election , it was 
implement ed primaril y because of political consider ations . The Nixon 
Administration saw the in fla t ionary pressures a nd the Watergate scandal as 
events which we r e und ermining the authori ty and c r ed i b ili ty of the 
President in the eyes of Congress and the electorate . In o rder to r ein-
state his position , the President decided on this dramatic move . This 
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attempted reinstatement can best be classified under the Electoral Politics 
Model . 
The August 1975 Grain Embargo 
During the summer of 1975, the Soviets again were in the United States 
markets procurring large amounts of grain. Both President Ford and the 
USDA reassured the public that these purchases would not significantly 
affect domestic prices because of the record c r op expec ted that year . 
However, there were others who disagreed with the Administration. Certain 
members of the Senate were concerned that the sales would recreat e the 
inflation which occ urred after the 1972 sales. The dairy industry, which 
had just been subjected to environmental restrictions and a lifting of 
import restrictions on milk and cheese , objected because they were fearful 
of a feed price increase. Also, as described in Chapter IV, the 
International Longshoremen's Association decided to boycott the loading of 
vessels bound fo r the Soviet Union until they were certain that the 
interests of the public and the Association were protec t ed . Under the 
pressure of these groups, the Administration asked the Soviets and the 
multinational g rain companies to reduce the magnitude of the deals . The 
President and members of the USDA and Economic Planning Board, after 
receiving reports of dry weather in the grain belt, decided to suspend any 
further sales to the Soviets. Secretar y Butz announced this decision on 
August 11 . 
Although this announcement appeased those wh o were against the sales, 
it caused an uproar from some farm groups and Congressmen wh o represented 
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rural America . These g r oups argued that the sales helped the balance of 
trade, raised farm income , and provided jobs. They objected not onl y to 
the interference of the Administration, but also to that of the 
Longshoremen, whom they felt wer e using political blackmail. 
The Soviets quickly g ranted concessions on the shipping situation but 
were slow to negotiate a long-term grain agreements for which the Fo rd 
Administration was asking. The Soviets were c ritical of an American demand 
for oil price concessions in exchange for grain. President Ford and 
Sec r etar y of Sta t e Henry Kissinger attempted to use the oil demand as a 
warning to OPEC that the Uni t ed States could e licit othe r sources of oil. 
The Administration had the backing of the Senate on this move . The 
Soviets, however , would not grant oil-pr ice concessions . As a coun t e r 
move, President Ford h ad the State Department announce a n embargo in late 
September on Poland requesting that a long-term g rain agreement also be 
signed by that nation. This wa s done to prevent g rain sales to that 
country, wh ich could then be transshipped to the Soviets , from increasing . 
This action was taken without prior consultation with the USDA. 
The Polish embargo lasted l ess than on e month . USDA officials con-
vinced President Ford to r emove the embargo once information suggested that 
there was going to be a record crop in the United States . The Sov iet 
embar go , however , was maintained . 
The embargo was finally terminated afte r the long-te rm grain ag r ee-
ments we r e signed in October . Although the Soviets did not concede to the 
United States demand on oil concessions, they did agree to look into the 
matter . 
99 
Even though the agreements were signed , there were still c riticisms 
from the agricultural sector and from member s of both House s conc e rning the 
length and effects of the embargo . Farm g r oups we r e c ritical because of 
the effect that rec ord production and the embargo had on prices. The y 
accused the State Department of manipulating both them and t he export 
market, which cost farmer s money. Members of both Houses cl aimed that the 
embargo hurt the c r edibility of American agriculture . 
The Ford Administration co unt er acted by saying that Co ngr ess would 
have imposed export c ontrols if an embar go was not instituted . The 
Administration then created the Agricultural Policy Commi ttee , c ha i red by 
Sec retary Butz, with the inten t of looking after t he interests of American 
agriculture (Weber 1977 , p. 272). This was done to help appease the farm 
g roups . 
Model Determination 
If one is t o at t empt to determine wh y President Fo r d o rde r ed the 
Soviet embargo in 1975, one must think about the press ure placed on Fo rd by 
the e l ec torate. Consumer gr oups were concerned ab ou t the i nfl ationar y 
aspects of the sales in t e rms of food price i nc r eases . The Longsho r emen 
were concerned about thi s also, as wel l as the fact that too l ittle g ra in 
was being tran sport ed on U. S. vessels . President Ford manipulated and 
formulated policy with these pressures in mind. This appeasement of the 
electorate can best be explained b y the El ec t oral Poli tics Model. 
Also instrumental in the decision-making pr ocess , b ut t o a lesser 
degree, would be the Personal Va l ues Model . By placing the embar go, Ford 
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wanted to prove to the Soviets, and possibly the American people, that he 
could act quickly and decisively when faced with important international 
issues. Instituting the embar go also fell in line with Ford's personal 
view that the Sov i ets should be negotiated with only from a position of 
strength . 
This personal view of negotiating from a position of strength was also 
instrumental in Ford's decision to embar go Po land when attempting to gain 
oil concessions. However, after only a short time, electoral consid era-
tions intervened, forcing Ford to lift the embargo once a reco rd c r op was 
predic ted. 
The January 1980 Grain Embargo 
During late 1979 and early January of 1980, the Soviet Red Army 
invaded Afghanistan, which lies on the Soviet southern border . The Sov iets 
claimed that this ac t ion came as a response to a r equest by the Afghan 
goverrunent to help quell disturbances by Afghan rebels . 
However, Pr esident James Carter and his advisors viewed the Soviet 
i ntervention as an act of agression and responded by initiating a g rain 
embargo on January 4, 1980, which involved a total of 13 million tons of 
United States corn, 4 million tons of wheat, l million tons o f soybeans, 
and various othe r agricultural goods (US DA, Update: Impact of Agricultural 
Trade Restrictions, Jul y 1980). This grain was over and above the minimum 
of 8 million tons the Soviets were r equired to purc hase under the g ra in 
agreements . Of the 8 mill ion tons the United States was required to ship 
unde r the agreements, 5.5 million t ons were already in Soviet ports . 
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President Carter attempted to use the embargoes to impress upon the 
Soviets the Uni ted States' dissatisfaction with the aggression which was 
taking place. The embargo was directed towards the Soviet livestock 
sector, which the Soviets had been trying to improve since approximately 
1965. The President ' s a uthority to embargo the g rain stemmed from the 
Export Administration Act of 1979 . This Act allows the President to em-
bargo goods during times of short domestic supply, for r easons of national 
security, and for foreign policy reasons. Since the President cited the 
latter two r easons for the embargo, he wa s required by the Act to consult 
with Congress. The Administrat ion complied with this requirement, and 
Congress endorsed the embargo. Then, on January 5, Secretary of 
Agriculture Bob Bergland announced a program which called fo r the Commodity 
Credit Corporation to purchase the embargoed grain . Actual purchases by 
the CCC began in early March. The CCC was also going to assume the 
contracts for undelive r ed grain held by the grain companies fo r Soviet 
delivery, which amounted to 21 .8 million metric tons of grain . 
Although the Carter Administration was willing to allow shipment of 
the r emainder of gra in sold to the Soviets under the grain agreements, the 
United States International Longshoremen's Association refused to load it. 
They finally relented to do so after a District Court upheld an order by 
Federal arbitrators to load the vessels bound for the Soveit Union . 
President Carter not only placed an embargo on the Soviets, but 
requested the other major grain exporting countries not to increase their 
shipments to fill the void left by the United States. Australia, Canada, 
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and the European Community agreed not to increase their shipments beyond 
the present amounts already contracted for, but they did continue to make 
arrangements for new contracts. Argentina, however, refused to accept the 
United States request but did agree to monitor trade flow. The 
Administration also asked the multinational grain companies not to sell 
non-United States grain, through their foreign affiliates, to the Soviets. 
Later in June, the Administration rescinded the request . This move was 
criticized by some members of Congress who felt that it was unfair to 
domestic farmers. 
By early summer, when it was becoming evident that the Sovie ts were 
not prepared to withdraw from Afghanistan, some members of both Houses 
called for an end to the sales suspension. They attempted to end the 
embargo by introducing an amendment to the appropriations bill which would 
limit the funds necessary to enforce the embargo. This amendment passed in 
the House but was defeated by the Senate. 
Ry late summer, with the 1980 Presidential election approaching, 
President Carter was faced with strong political opposi tion to the embar go . 
As stat ed previously, opposition was beginning to mount in both Houses as 
well as with farm groups and Republican Presidential candid a t e Ronald 
Reagan . The President, however, maintained his position refusing to lift 
the embargo until the Soviets made a move to withdraw its forces . 
The unpopularity of this position was one of several factors which 
caused the defeat of President Car t er during that year's elections. 
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The embar go was finally lift ed by President Reagan after it was 
clearly evident that it was not accomplishing the desi r ed objective of 
pressuring the Soviets out of Afghanistan. 
Model Determination 
In order to categorize the particular embar go , o ne must not only 
consider the initial causes of the embar go but also the reasons for its 
duration. 
One of the primary tenets of the Carter Administration ' s foreign 
policy was that of upholding basic human rights to ensure that a gove rnment 
o r nation did not forc e its will upon its population or that of another 
country without the other's consent. The advocacy of this principle 
involved an ongoing process of evaluation of a country 's performance 
concerning the preservation of these right s . If it was deemed that those 
being scrutinized were not adhering t o the stand ards set by the Carter 
Administration, then that party could be subjected to several possible 
forms of coercion in the attempt to make their actions conform to the 
preconceived s tandards . This coercion could be in the form of reduced 
financial and/or military aid , a reduction of trade, a strain in diplomatic 
r elations, o r any combination of the three . 
Consequently, when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan , the Carter 
Administration viewed it as a violation of the Afghans' human rights and 
employed trade sanctions. Also, as in the 1975 grain embargo by the Ford 
Administration, President Cart er felt that some type of retaliation had to 
occur to show the Soviets a nd, to a lesser degree , the United States 
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electorate, that he could act quickly and decisively when faced wi th 
important international issues. Thus, the Personal Values Model would best 
c ategorize the actions taken by President Carter. 
As the duration of the emba r go began to leng then, electoral cons idera-
tions became influential . By late s ummer and early fall , wh e n it was 
apparent that the embargo was not achieving the desired objectives , eleven 
of thirteen Presidential advi so r s suggested t o the President t hat the 
embargo be lifted. However, President Carter r efused to lift the embargo 
in an attempt to show t oughness and r esolve to the Uni t ed States elector ate 
(Under Secretary of Agriculture Dale Hathaway - 1981 , personal interview) . 
Thi s decision would best be ca t egor ized unde r the El ectora l Politics 
Model. 
It must b e r emembered that one mod e l canno t completely ex plain a 
particular political decision-making process. Because o f the enormous s ize 
and complexit y of the United States political system , it is virtual l y 
impossible fo r all of the par adigms to be excluded . A cer tain number of 
elements of e ach will be included . 
It seems that the decisions of whether or not t o sell gra1n to the 
Soviets is most influenced by the Elector al Politics Model, with the 
Personal Values Model playing a sup portive r o le (the elements whic h 
compr ise the El ec t oral Politics Model and their relevance will be discussed 
i n f urther deta i l in the concluding c hap t e r ) . 
Schattschneider expl a ins the usefulness of the El ectoral Politics 
Model in t wo ways . 
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" First , the political r egime of the United States is a function-
ing representative democracy . Secondly , agricultural export 
decisions affect a significant, though numerically dwindling, 
portion of the electorate" (Schattschneider 1960, p. 2). 
Since so many of the electo rat e are affected by export policy decision-
making, it is difficult to make policy without being influenced by those 
voters. Also, the magnitude of the resulting ramifications makes it 
difficult for the Executive branch to manage a decision alone . Hence, 
Congress, with its legal authority, political capability, and vested 
interests, becomes involved to help manage expor t policy. Fann, export, 
and consumer groups become involved because they are affected by export 
decisions . With the variety and number of acto rs involved, it becomes 
necessary to incorporate specific elements of the Electoral Politics Model 
i nto the decision- making process in orde r to implement a policy which would 
appease what, a t that specific time, appears to be the most important group 
of actors involved. These specific elements would be problem solving , 
connnand, persuasion , compromising, and bargaining . Examples of these 
e l ement s would be: 1) prob lem solving - when President Nixon imposed a 
price freeze on goods and eventually a grain embargo to reduce the r ate of 
inflat ion and consequently appease the electorate; 2) command - wh en 
President Carter ord e r ed the 1980 grain emba r go against the Soviets; 
3) persuasion - whe n President Ford attem pted to reassure the American 
public that Soviet grain purchases would not recreate the inflation which 
occurred during the last sales; 4) compromising - when President Ford 
agr eed to ask the Soviets to grant shipping concession s in exchange for the 
International Longshoremen ' s end to their boycott of the loading of vessels 
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bound for the Soviet Union; 5) bargaining - when President Ford attempted 
to demand oil-price concessions in exchange for gra in . 
Using the Elec t oral Politics Model to help explain, the agricultural 
fo r eign policy decision- making process of the United States should con-
tinue. As the world economy becomes more complex, decisions made conce rn-
ing either the domestic or foreign arena will have consequences in the 
other arena . As these arenas grow to become larger and more complex , so, 
too, will the number and complexit y of the groups of actors involved g row. 
It would be impossible to divorce the Personal Values Model from the 
decision-making process . As l ong as · there are actors and groups involved, 
their r easoning ability will be influenced by the elements whic h comprise 
this paradigm. These elements are personal beliefs and values, career 
development, psychological make-up, and the influence of dramatic events . 
The components of these various elements, naturally, may not be directly 
related t o the problem at hand but coul<l have been developed by past 
dramatic events (e . g . , the conception of ho w agricultural trade is handled 
could be influenced by a past dramatic occurr ence such as the Arab oil 
embargo) . 
Since the background material has been discussed, it is now necessary 
to address the previously stated object ives . From Chapter I, thos e 
objec tives are: 1) by using the three embargoes , find the conditions fo r 
success and failure so that a generalized list ma y be made to compare and 
contrast with future embargoes when they occur . Conditions may be eclec-
tically chosen f r om the generalized list , which would r es ult in the highest 
probability of success when applied t o a future embargo after the situation 
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surrounding the pending embargo has been studied; and 2) to determine the 
strengths and weaknesses of the chosen model, and, if possible, to suggest 
what the model fails to explain in terms of the decision-making process. 
This finalization will constitute the remainder of this work. 
Table 6 .1. United States Soybean Production (1,000 bu. )a 
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 
Soybeans 
Cl , 000 bu. ) 1,125,772 1,174,620 1,281,417 1,545,364 1,213,37 5 
a . b FAO Trade and Production Year oaks. 
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1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
1 , 519,600 1,286,041 1,759,691 1,840,468 2,265,234 1,816,356 
Table 6.2 . United States Exports of Soybeans by Count ry (l,000 bu.)a 
19 70 1971 1972 1973 1974 
Japan 102,791 107,379 120,983 98,754 96,895 
Western Europe 239 , 021 232, 102 254,550 312,489 241,399 
China 1,210 25,269 1,378 
Eastern Europe 
(exc 1. USSR) 6,059 2, 424 6,046 4,300 5,488 
USSR 31,465 654 
Wo r ld 433,801 416,829 479,443 539,129 420,703 
aStatistical Annuals of the CBT. 
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1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
118,091 118,262 125,310 153,466 136,202 148,183 
329,421 310,039 841 '733 401,367 392' 141 438,688 
1,739 50,452 15,146 22,255 
10,340 6,000 4, 100 l, 287 26,157 24 '743 
11 ,408 30,328 20,745 43,621 66 ,760 6,350 
555,094 564 , 069 1,068,505 755,971 76 7 ,425 800, 199 
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CHAPTER VII . CONCLUSION 
Josling, in his study of recent United States embargoes, has 
sunnnarized lessons which have resulted from these past policies. They 
are: 1) embargoes disrupt normal trade patterns and inhibit the growth of 
trade, especial ly if contracts are broken; 2) embargoes support the 
argument of domestic self-sufficiency and hurt those in the importing 
country who favor fewer protectionist policies; this may include either 
conslllller groups and /o r the food industry; 3) embargoes may encourage 
importers to inc r ease their stocks which would in turn increase their 
costs; 4) embargoes may lead importers to seek alternative supplies and 
possibly negotiate bilateral and/or multilateral agreements; 5 ) importers 
realize that ex porters need markets and that domestic pressure wil l 
usually force exporter s to lift the embargo after a short duration; 
6) importers know that after a time embargoes tend to be ineffective 
because of market adjustments; 7) past situations and conditions have 
shown that embargoes are unlikely against Less Developed Countries but are 
likely during times of armed conflict; and 8) both importers and 
exporters realize that alternatives t o an emba r go would be costly . An 
export tax would increase prices to importers, and bilateral agreements 
would force impor te r s to pay a premium for a relatively secure supply 
( Josling 1981, p . 2) . 
These lessons can lead one to make generalizations concerning the 
possible effects of and reactions t o embargoes. A multilateral embargo 
would be more cause for alarm to a target country than a unilateral 
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embargo. A multilateral effort would be similar to a cartel . A political 
embargo used "in extremis" would find more widespread acceptance i n the 
international community than one used after a minor confrontation. A 
situation such as this may occur a fte r an embar goed country has taken an 
action that strongly violates values held in common by several exporting 
countries . Economic embargoes have a more disruptive influence on trade 
relationships than on political relations. In the shor t run, competitive 
exporter s have the opportunity to gain from a unilateral embar go. 
However, in the l ong run they can be hurt if the embargoed nation 
impl emen t s some type of anti-trade policy. Embargoing a large importing 
count r y increases the probability of affecting other countries and is more 
likel y to be effective in reducing imports by that count r y. This is in 
con trast to a country with small importing needs that could fulfill them 
easily elsewhere. If a large export i ng country embargoes a country with 
large importing needs, the event may actually increase domestic producers' 
inc ome in the count r y placing the embargo . Assuming that the impor ting 
country can find alternative sources and that world supply of that good is 
highly inelastic, the resulting price increase will be substantial. The 
embar going nation will then receive higher prices for that good it sends 
to o the r countries. Whether or not producer i ncome increases will depend 
on whether marginal revenue exceeds the marginal cost of increased 
domestic stocks (Johnson 1960, pp. 343-345). Any type of embargo will 
dis rupt international trade patterns . However, domestic considerations 
may have been more influential in the decision-making process than the 
cost of trade disruptions (Josling 1981, p. 2) . 
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These lessons and generalizations of the effec ts of and reactions to 
embargoes can be used to formulate a list of conditions which, if present, 
will increase the probability of implementing a successful embargo. 
However, because the circumstances and conditions surrounding an 
embar go will be different each time , the influence of the ind ivid ual 
conditions will be different depending on the situation. It must be 
remembered that these are not absolute conditions or circumstances. Their 
absence will not guarantee failure; however, their presence in most 
situations should create an atmosphere whereby the embargo has the highest 
probability of achieving the desired goals and objectives of those 
decision makers implementing the embargo. Conversely, if the presence of 
each of the individual conditions increases the probability of success, 
their absence should increase the probability of failur e. As stated 
before, there is no absolute guarantee either way. 
Paarlberg feels that condi t ions must be favorable in three separate 
arenas for a successful embargo to occur . Those arenas are: l) 11 within 
the political system of the nation seeking to exercise food power; 
2) within the bounds of the international food trading system; and 
3 ) within the political and economic system sys tem of the targe t nation" 
(Paarlb erg 1980. p . 145). The Administration must be successful in 
preventing the good not only from moving out of its own country but from 
other countries as well. This r educ tion of exports to the target must 
also be large enough to produce the desired results (Paarlberg 1980, 
p. 145). 
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Paarlberg's conditions can be broken down into a more detailed list. 
This list includes: 1) multilateral cooperation; 2) domestic political 
support; 3) vulnerability of the target country; 4) goals and duration; 
and 5) moral implications. 
Multilateral Cooperation 
If an embargoing country does not have a monopoly on the product 
being embargoed, it must naturally enlist the cooperation of other 
producing nations that may export that product so that the trade void will 
not be filled . If these other nations are to cooperate, their heads-of-
state must be notified and convinced that an embargo is necessary and will 
be carried out (Roney 1982, p. 202) . This will allow other exporters 
ample time to evaluate the situation and decide whether or not the embargo 
is justifiable and if their country should either join in or increase 
their exports of that good . One could argue that by informing another 
country of a pending embargo, that country could better prepare itself to 
fill the void, especially if it felt that an embargo was not necessary. 
This may be true; however, it seems that it would be easier to enlist a 
country's cooperation by consulting with it before rather than after the 
fact . 
However, if another supplier did not cooperate, it may be possible 
for the embargoing country to coerce them into cooperation by reducing 
economic and/or military aid or by undercutting its other markets in not 
only the embargoed good but in other goods as well. This could be done by 
subsidizing exports of similar goods thereby taking away the uncooperative 
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country 's markets creating a surplus in that count r y . This would be 
costly to the embargoing nation. The question must then be asked -- how 
much of a cost is the embargoing country willing to pay in order to 
undercut the uncooperative nation? A determination of this is affected by 
decision makers ' perceptions of their own country ' s national character as 
well as that of the uncooperative country, and by the social and 
political - economic relationships that exist between the two nations. 
Arranging this cooperation obviously could not come from a drawn- out 
international debate . It must be enlisted as quickly and secretly as 
possible to prevent the embargoed nation from preparing for the sanctions, 
thus lessening the effects . This would also help to minimize the 
resulting market fluctuations which would occur since trading of the 
embargoed good would be restricted . 
This consultation with other exporters would only be necessary if a 
good was being embargoed from a country to protest an action taken by that 
country. If a good was being embar goed because of a domestic shortage, 
then it would be necessary to inform the major importers of that good. If 
this was not done and the importers could not adequately adjust to the 
sudden loss of that good, then the exporter could be accused of not being 
a reliable suppl ier and could consequently lose a marke t when adequate 
exporting supplies were available. The exporter could possibly help the 
embargoed nation find alternative sour ces of supply. Th is would, however, 
upset domestic producers. This could also have both short- and long-term 
consequences on the success or failure of future trade or embargoes since 
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actions taken today may affect the outcome of future actions (i . e., shared 
and personal values may be influenced). 
These two tenets were violated during the grain embargo of 1980 and 
the soybean embar go of 1973. One of the primary reasons that Argentina, 
and later the other major exporters, did not adhere to the 1980 embargo 
was because of this lack of prior consultation (Roney 1982, p . 202) . This 
naturally limited the effectiveness of the embargo. Likewise, before the 
1973 embargo, Japan, one of the largest importers of United States 
soybeans, was not informed, which caused consternation in that country. 
Although Japan was not lost as a market, it did force the Japanese to look 
elsewhere for other large suppliers, most notably Brazil, and resulted in 
the Japanese making investments in the Brazilian soybean industry in the 
interest of import security (Hopkins and Puchala 1980, p . 59 ) . It also 
alarmed other importing nations such as the European Economic Community, 
causing them to consider increasing their self-sufficiency in oilseed 
production (Josling 1981, p. 3). 
Domestic Political Support 
Because of the complex nature of the political-economic structure of 
the United States, it is literally impossible to initiate a policy or 
program that would be beneficial to all United States citizens. Knowing 
this, the decision maker, when initiating policy, will attempt to garner 
the marginal support necessary to prevent that policy from being 
undermined and thereby lessening its effectiveness . 
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In order to achieve the necessary support, three things must be 
accomplished. First, the public must be aware of and agree with the 
objectives and be convinced of their likely effectiveness. Without this 
awareness, the public will be uncertain as to whether or not the embargo 
is meeting its expectations. 
Secondly, an Administration must convince the groups who perceive 
themselves as being hurt the most by the embargo that they are not 
carrying a disproportionate burden as everyone else. This can be done by 
compensating these groups for the losses which they may incur or by 
convincing them that other segments of the domestic sector are also 
equally sharing the burden. 
Lastly, the Administration must convince others of the seriousness of 
its intentions. If the Administration institutes an embargo, it must do 
everything within its rightful power to see that the embargo is carried 
out to its fullest. This would mean negating all contracts and agreements 
made by both the private and public sectors to prevent as much of the 
embargoed good from reaching the country as possible, or to keep as much 
of the embargoed good as possible from leaving the country if it is in 
short supply. However, given the discusion in Chapter Von the structure 
of the international grain marketing system, it is difficult to restrict 
the destination of grain after it leaves an exporting country's port . 
Consequently, it may be easier to enforce a general embargo aimed at 
completely stopping exports than an embargo aimed at one country. 
During 1980 the United States domestic sector was uncertain as to the 
exact objectives and effectiveness of the embargo. Many felt that the 
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desired goa l was t o f o r ce the Soviets out of Afghanistan. Wh en thi s did 
not occur, the domest ic s ector quickl y became disillusioned as to its 
effectiveness (Under Secretary o f Agriculture Dale Hathaway - 1981, 
personal int e rview). 
The Carter Administration also failed in its attempt to convince the 
agricultural sec tor that the y were not carr ying a dispr oportionate share 
o f the burden the embargo was c rea ting. This occ urred even though the CCC 
purchased the embargoed grain. 
The Carter Admini stration also violated the third item because it 
allowed the multinational grain c ompanie s to se ll non-United States grain 
th r ough thei r foreign affiliates t o the Soviets , wh ich many felt was 
unfair to the domestic farm sec t or. 
Vulnerability~ Target Country 
According to Hathaway , a countr y would be considered vulne r able to an 
emb argo if it had one o r more of the followi ng characteristics: 1) it has 
a we ak gov ernment; 2) it has a high import level of the embargoed good; 
3) the t otal import volume of the good is high i n r e lation to world trade; 
and 4) the embargo disrupts the goals a nd objectives of the embar goed 
country (Under Secretary of Agriculture Dale Hathaway - 198 1, pe r sonal 
interview) . 
If the embargoed good i s vi ta l to the nat ional security of a country, 
it would make it easier for the embargoing country to negotiat e from a 
position of s trength if it was trying t o gain concessions or if it was 
retaliating against action s taken by the emb argoed nation. A nation, 
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having a weak government, placed under the stress o f the embargoing of an 
essential good, would be especially vulnerable since it would be exposed 
to the threat of a coup or overthrow. If that country's import level is 
high, especially in relation to total world trade in that good, it would 
be difficult to procure the good immediately from other sources. Other, 
perhaps smaller, sources would have to be found, negotiations carried out, 
shipping arranged, and finally delivery made. This would take time, and 
money and may be difficult to achieve on short notice for a country 
operating under a centralized system. During this time, a nation may have 
to draw down its reserve stocks. The fact that a nation is a large user 
of a good would have a direct bearing on whether or not it could be 
effectively embargoed. The primary reason the United States did not 
embargo Iran during the hostage crisis was because Iran's import 
requirements were so small -- not only from the United States but in 
relation to total world trade -- that it would not have been difficult for 
the Iranians to fulfill their needs elsewhere. 
Disrupting a country's goals and objectives would not be difficult if 
that country depended to a large degree on the embargoed good to carry out 
its plans. However, it would be difficult to quantify exactly to what 
extent the plans were disrupted, especially if a country operated under a 
closed system . 
The vulnerability of a target country will also depend on the 
willingness of its people to endure the hardships of the embargo. This 
willingness would be a reflection of the national character of a country , 
which as stated in Chapter III is a frequently ignored element of 
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political-economic decision making. Naturally, this element is impossible 
to quantify, and how it is integrated into policy will depend on how it is 
perceived by the decision makers. 
The vulnerability of the Soviet Union was misinterpreted by both 
President Ford and Carter when they imposed their respectiv e embargoes . 
During the 1975 embargo, President Ford attempted t o disrupt the 
Soviet's grain import goals by demanding o il price concessions in exchange 
for the grain the Soviets were purchasing. However, the Soviets did not 
concede to these demands even after the Unit ed States embargoed Poland . 
The Ford Administration had overestimated the Soviet's need fo r g rain when 
trying to barter for the price concessions . 
During the 1980 embargo, President Carter attempted to disrupt 
production in the Soviet's livestock sector by denying them feed grain . 
However, the pressure imposed upon the Soviets was not great enough to 
force any type of withdrawal from Afghanistan. 
It may be argued that the decision makers of both the United States 
and the Soviet Union perceived the ability and willingness of the Soviet 
people to withstand the embargoes in different ways. The United States' 
decision-makers hoped that the disruption in import levels and livestock 
output would translate into the unrest of the Soviet citizen , wh ich would 
put pressure on the Soviet government . This did not occur. The Soviet 
government's ability to correctly interpret their national charact er 
allowed them to initiate policy in spite of actions taken against them 
directed toward their consumer g roups. This is not to say that the 
embargoes did not produce some effects . Howev er, they were not as 
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significant as hoped. This sugges ts that decision makers of western 
nation s have a much less und erstanding of the national characte r of 
eastern nations than they do of western nations. Presidents Fo r d and 
Carter's misjudgment of the Soviet Union' s v ulnerability is a 
manifestation of this. 
Goal a nd Du r ation 
Because of the charac t e r istics and structure of the world political -
economic sys t em, no emb a r go or sanction can last permanen t ly . Since no 
one country has a monopoly on an y one good and because of the r elat ive 
free market economy of the wor ld , other producers will be tempted to earn 
a pr of it by supplying the good. If for some reason the sanctioned country 
c anno t obtain an adequa t e supply, the possibilit y exis t s that subs tit utes 
could be found , the country over time could rebuild its supply f r om 
with i n, or it could simply go without . Consequently, once the objec tive s 
of the embar go have been set, some t ype of goal or dur ation should be set 
in terms of volume and/o r time . This could be done privately or made 
public (Roney 1982 , p . 204), This cond ition would be beneficial to the 
implementing Administration no matter if the embargo was a success or 
failur e in terms of the predetermined goals and objectives . If the 
emba r go was s uccessful, it could a lwa ys be extended; and if it was a 
failure, the Administration would have a face-saving r eason to terminate 
it. 
The 1973 soybean embargo was successful in this respect since the 
length of the embargo was contingent upon the next soybean crop . If the 
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crop was sufficient enough to replenish stocks, then the embargo could be 
lifted; if not, it could be extended . 
As stated in the Domestic Political Support section of this chapter, 
the American public was uncertain as to the goals and duration of the 1980 
embargo. As a result, President Carter faced pressure from both Houses, 
farm groups, and the electorate. This was especially crucial since it was 
during the presidential primaries . The disillusionment of these groups 
intensified as time went on, which put further pressure on the President . 
Since no specific goals or duration were announced, President Carter had 
no face-saving reason to terminate the embargo once it was evident that it 
was failing. 
Moral Implications 
It is possible that a country, or g roup of countries , that chooses to 
embargo goods such as food and/or feed grains could come under severe 
domestic and international criticism if it appeared that the embargo was 
part of a starvation policy. Denying a country the required food 
necessary to keep a part of its population alive would not be condoned 
within the international conununity. This is because an embargo of this 
type would punish the poorest of that nat ion, those who usually have no 
real power within their country ' s political system . A starvation policy 
could only be justified during a condit i on of war . This could only come 
about if the target country initiated an act so dramatic that the 
international community would ban together and rally against that nation 
(Roney 1982, p . 205). This, of course, still would not guarantee a 
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completely successful embargo as the target country would still have its 
allies to draw supplies from if, indeed, the supplies were available . 
However, international approval of such a policy would increase the 
pr obability of a successful embargo as supporting nations withdrew 
supplies (Under Secretary of Agriculture Dale Hathaway - 1981, personal 
interview) . 
Of the five conditions listed, the moral implications element has 
probably been the most ignored when analyzing past agricultural policy 
decisions. This is because 1n none of the examples being studied were any 
of the decision-makers ever accused by the international community of 
implementing a starvation policy. The embargoes affected primarily the 
livestock sectors of those countries who lost their g r ain supply, which 
would decrease l ong-term meat output but not necessarily food output . 
An accusation of thi s type by the international community was never 
levied because it was realized that the embargoes did affec t the livestock 
sector mo r e than the populace and, secondly, because it was also realized 
that none of the embargoes was so devastatingly effective as to reach the 
populace to any significant degree. Even if they had been completely 
effective, they would not have brought on starvation or near starvation, 
o r probably even hunger. 
To achieve the second objective of this work, that of determining the 
strengths and weaknesses of the Electoral Politics Model (EPM), and 
attempting to s uggest what thi s model fails to explain in terms of the 
decision-making process, one must know that fundamental assumptions were 
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used to develop the model. This is essential because the assumptions 
determine how effective a particular model will be . Naturally , the more 
accurate the assumptions, the easier it will be to determine whether a 
particular model is appropriate in describing a decision-making process . 
It must be remembered that the EPM was not created exclusively for 
the examination of agricultural policy decision-making. It was c r eated to 
examine broader, less-defined areas of the decision-making process . 
Consequently, the points mentioned next might not be appropriate or 
qualify when discussing areas outside of agriculture . However, if it was 
created for that purpose alone or was being applied for that purpose, the 
EPM might take the following points into consideration . 
As stated previously, the EPM evolved from two earlier theories on 
political behavior by Anthony Downs and David Mayhew . They both agreed 
that the goal of the political actors is to become elected or re- elected 
in order to achieve other goals and objectives when finally in office. 
Some of the major assumptions of how this was to occur, however, were 
slightly different. Downs felt that political actors operated with their 
own self- interest 1n mind but within the confines of the law and without 
harming othe rs of the same political party . Mayhew felt that politics was 
" a struggle among men to gain and maintain power" (Mayhew 1975, p. 6) . 
The EPM has deviated from the original concept of attempting to 
become either e l ected or re-elected in order to achieve goals and now 
assumes that actors formulate po licy in order to become elected. However, 
it still maintains that the actors operate for their o wn self-interest and 
to gain power . 
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The primary assumptions of the EPM as desc r ibed in Chapter II a r e as 
follows: 
1) Political groups and acto r s desir e either the office or to 
influence those in office to r eap the benefits which accrue. 
2) The groups or actors will formulate policies to achieve these 
goals instead of becoming elected t o fo rmulate policy; in o ther 
word s , they tr y t o f ormulate policies to win elections, not win 
elections to formulate policies. 
3) Policy action is a result of electoral demands and supports . 
4) The economic rationality of the policy as it relates to the 
problem at hand may be ignored in o rd e r t o win the vo t e r. 
5) The groups or actors only tr y to garner enough support to win the 
election or to influence the elected. 
The strengths in the assumptions of the EPM are manifold and are in 
evidence numerous times in the embargoes being studied . Of the major 
assumptions mentioned, all except the second can be used to construct a 
sound model. Examples will illustrate how these assumptions help shape 
the EPM. 
The first assumption, that of political gr oups o r ac to r s desiring 
either the office or to influence those in office , was evident during the 
1975 embargo as the International Longshoreman's Assoc iation attempted to 
pressure President Ford by r efus ing t o load g rain onto vessels. 
Succeeding at this would have enhanced their political clout. Examples of 
attempts by actors desiring the office of President, or in these 
si tuations to become re-elected, are numerous. These actors naturally are 
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after the benefits of power, prestige, income, and to fulfill the desire 
for conflict . 
The third assumption, that of policy action being a result of 
electoral demands and supports, again is evidenced frequently. At times, 
the policy maker will attempt to determine what type of political and/or 
economic environment the electorate desires and then will formulate policy 
to achieve such an environment. This was just such the case in 1973 when 
President Nixon ordered the soybean embargo. At that time the electorate 
had been presurring the President to keep inflation in check. To 
alleviate this pressure, the President first o rd ered a sixty-day price 
freeze and then the soybean embargo in order to keep prices down. 
The fourth assumption, ignoring the economic rationalit y of the 
policy to win the voter, was in effect during the 1980 embargo. After it 
had become apparent that the embargo was ineffective, President Carter, 
against the advice of the majority of his advisors, refused to lif t the 
sanction. The President may have understood that the embargo was not 
producing the desired effec t but kept it on in order to appear st r ong and 
decisive to the electorate. 
The final assumption, garne ring enough support to win or to influence 
the e lected, is in effect whenever action is taken. Decision makers 
und erstand that it would be irrational in terms of time , money, and effort 
to attempt to gain more than th e margin nec essary for approval of a policy 
or action. They do not try to create a mandate , if possible, but to 
garner only enough support t o move fo rward in the policy and decis i on-
making process. 
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The second assumption states tha t groups or actors will formulate 
policies to achieve goals , instead of becoming elected to formulate 
policy . This is the weakest of the assumptions. Pe r haps it is not so 
much a weakness as being incompl ete because it is not elaborate enough . 
Not on ly do po litical actors formulate policy to become elected, they must 
do other things as well. They also formulate policy to maintain elec t or al 
suppo rt once they a r e in office . The EPM assumes, to an extent , that onc e 
the election 1s ov er, the electoral pr ocess is also over. This is not 
true . Onc e elected, the actor must curry public opinion to maintain 
enough suppo r t to implement policy as well as maintain the appearance of 
power . It becomes a political necessity to manipulate policy in o rder to 
increase elector a te satisfaction. Maint aining this electorate satis -
faction will help when the actor is impl ementing policy which he believes 
will not only make him better than his predecessors but will aid his 
constituents and those in the internat i onal arena . The actor then is 
r unning a con tinuous election in order to maintain a momentum of support 
which will help during times when an unpopular decision must be made and 
then carried out . Th is concep t relates back to the original thesis of 
Mayhew and Downs -- that actors win elections in orde r to implement 
policy . 
To accomplish his goals, the actor must have, or appear to have , the 
characteristics of credibility, authority, toughness , and resolve. Thes e 
traits will help the acto r t o nego tiate f r om a position of strength . 
(What he is trying to project as an image , at times, could perhaps also be 
categori zed under the Personal Values Model . ) 
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These points were evident during the 1973 and 1980 embargoes . 
President Nixon was setting a polic y t o maintain his c r ed ibilit y and 
appearance of power, while President Carter was trying to increase 
electoral suppor t to become re-elected as well as maintain his human 
rights post ure by helping those in the international arena . 
Consequently, the EPM fails to do what Mayhew and Downs or iginally 
intended it to d o . It fails t o explain why political actors continue the 
electoral process even afte r they are elected. Thus, in order t o adopt 
and apply the EPM to agricultural po licy decision making, one must also 
i ncorporate Mayhew' s and Downs ' s concept that actors attempt t o become 
elected to formulate po l icy and not just t o gain powe r but t o maintain it 
as well . 
Summary 
Elements that must be considered in j udging the likely success of an 
embargo are: 1) multil a t e ral cooperation ; 2) domestic political s up po rt ; 
3) vulnerability of the target country ; 4) goa l s and duration; 5) mo r al 
implic ations . Decis i on- maker s must determine how muc h s i gn ificance each 
e lement or condition must be g i ven after examining the situat ion at hand . 
Fi r s t , the y must ask themselves if they can indeed gain the necessary 
s upport in both the i nte rnational and domestic a r enas to carr y o ut policy 
ac t ions. As demonstrated, thi s can be dif fi cult . The f airness of the 
policy mus t be considered . Ad equate justification must be given, and 
poss ibl e compensation must be doled out in or der to gain the necessar y 
support, o r the oppos ite ma y be necessary. Those who do not cooperat e may 
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have to be punished t o demonstrate the seriousness of the intentions of 
the embargoing nation. Secondly, the decision-makers must determine the 
vulnerabilit y of the target country. The import needs of that country 
must be examined to see if trade in the embargoed good will be dis rupted 
to any significan t degree . This may affect the goals and objectives of 
the target nation . The stability of the government and th e national 
character (their willingness to tolerate an embar go) must also be taken 
into consider a tion. Consequently, good in format ion on the political-
economic condition of the embargoed country as well as their national 
character is necessary to predict their likely response to an embargo . If 
there is a low tolerance by either the government or the people to 
withstand trade sanctions, this may increase the probability of achieving 
a s uccessful embar go. 
Thirdly, the decision-makers must have pre-determin ed goals and 
objectives in which to measure the relative success of the embargo once 
initiated . This will allow them the opportunity to either maintain the 
sanction or withdraw it without losing credibility . Lastly, the moral 
implications must be considered. If the sanction is deemed too severe or 
dramatic by either the domestic or international arenas in r elation to the 
reason it was orde r ed , then adequate support may not be provided to carry 
ou t the action . 
How much consideration the decision-maker gives to any one individual 
condition may be determined by c urrent electoral considerations . The 
resulting decision may then become a function of electoral factors. 
Policy makers are constantl y trying to maintain c r ed ibility, autho rity, 
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and popularity in order to more easily carry out policy. Consequently, 
decision-makers continue the electoral process even after being elected in 
order to maintain the electoral satisfaction necessary to carry out 
policy. This reverts back to the original i nt ention of Mayhew and Downs 
of why decision-makers continue the e l ectoral process a nd is the 
unde r lying weakness of the EPM. 
Through the anal ysis of policy and the examination of the decision-
making process, it is apparent that politics and economics are indeed 
linked 1n the reality of domestic and international relations. A 
condition has evolved whereb y there is not just a consonanc e between 
politics and economics but an almost inseparability when dealing in 
domestic and in ternational r elations . A political-economic event in one 
arena , either domestic or international, will have a highly visible effect 
on the other . So as long as there is contact between two nations, a 
significant event in one will have an impact on the other . This, of 
course, can be good or bad depending on the event. Natur ally, some events 
cannot be controlled , and an unexpecting nation may have to suffer the 
consequences . 
Because of the various links, actors mus t understand the 
r elationships which exist so that not only can they be prepared for 
uncontrollable or unexpected events, but so they can manipulate policy t o 
better serve those for whom they are respon sible. 
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APPENDIX. HOLDINGS OF MULTINATIONAL GRAIN FIRMS 
Cargill, Incorporated : 
Oilseed Processing Plants: 14 in U.S., 3 in Europe 
Memphis, Tennessee - soybeans 
Gainesville, Georgia 
Norfolk, Virginia 
San Francisco, California 
Sioux City, Iowa 
Cedar Rapids, I owa - soy flour plant, also corn r efining plant 
and Textratein producer 
Faye tteville, North Carolina - 12 ,000 ,000 bushels annuall y ; 
33,000 bushels, 1,000 tons per day capaci t y 
Feed Manufacturing Plants: (35 i n the U.S ., more than 20 in Europe ) 
(1) Rowan, Iowa - purchased in 1968 from Farmers Gra in and Feed 
Coop. 
(2) Omaha, Nebraska and (3) Havana , I llinois - combined annual 
capacity more than 100,000 tons 
(4) Kansas City 
(5) Centrevill e, I owa 
(6) Jacksonv ill e, Fl orida - Painter Poultry Co ., Inc. 
(sub sidiar y) feed mill 
(7) Vincennes, Indiana - j oint ope r a tion as Nutre na by Cargill 
and Bilskie Farm Suppl y Co. 
(8) Minneapolis , Minneso t a 
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Feed Manufacturing Plants: (continued) 
( 9 ) Greenfield, Indiana 
(10) Houston, Texas - liquid protein supplement 
(11) Memphis, Tennessee and (12) Port Cargill, Minnesota - liquid 
protein supplement . 
(13) Sioux City, Iowa 
(14) Alix, Arkansas - primaril y turke y feed - 240, 000 tons pe r 
year - cost $500,000 . 
( 15 ) Westville, Oklahoma - operated by Lincoln Liquid Feed Plant; 
Davenport, I owa - located on Mississippi Rive r . 
Grain Elevators: 
Alabama: Gunt ersville 
California: Sacramento 
Col orado: Denver 
Delaware: Seaford 
Florida: Tampa 
Illinois : Centerville; Chic ago; Gi bson City - 4 , 000 , 000 bushels , 
also corn drying capac it y of 10,000 bushels pe r hour 
Indiana: Princeton; Vincennes - 400,000 bushels - "Ingleheart" 
o perated as joint ven ture by Ca r g il l and Rilskie Fann Supply 
Co.; Lind e n - inland gr ain (Indiana corn, soybeans and 
wheat ) handling t e rminal - capac ity 1 . 9 million b ushels 
located on two maj or rail line s . 
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Gra in Elevators: (continued) 
Iowa: Algona; Cedar Rapids (2); Council Bluffs; Des Moines; 
Redfield; Rowan - 300,000 bushels storage with feed mill; 
Sexton; Sioux City; Washington; Alta - 330,000 bushel 
storage; Beaver - 486,000 bushel storage 
Kansas: Kansas City - 10,000,000 bushels 
Kentucky: Madisonville 
Louisiana: Port Allen - "Port of Baton Rouge; " Shreveport 
Minnesota: Breckenridge - stores sunflower seeds; Columbia 
Heights - flax plant; Cr ookston; Duluth - 10,000,000 
bushels - " Occident" purchased from Peavey 
Mississippi: Natchez 
Missouri: Forest City; Kansas City - 3,300,000 bushel -
"Milwaukee" 
New York: Albany; Buffalo - 7,600,000 bushels 
North Carolina: Fayetteville - 3,500,000-bushel storate capacity 
at soybean processing plant; Washington; Wilson . 
North Dakota : Wyndmere - 300,000-bushel storage. 750-ton 
fertilizer blending. Small seed cleansing plant . Operated 
by Richland Grain Co.; Anamoose - 150,000 bushel storage 
Ohio: Lima; Maumee - "Toledo"; Toledo - "East Side" 
Oregon: Portland 
South Dakota: Aberdeen; Milbank; Trent 
Tennessee: Chattanooga; Memphis - "Port of Memphis;" Memphis -
"President Island Oil Plant" 
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Grain Elevators: (continued) 
Texas: Channelview, Jacin toport (near Houston); Port Arthur -
"Port Arthur Canal & Dock Company" - 3,500,000 bushels -
elevator, storage tanks, railroad track and acreage leased 
from Kansas City Southern Industries, Inc. 
Washington: Rosalia - 300,000 bushels; Seattle - 4,200,000 
bushels "P ier 86" leased (from Burlington ) fully automated; 
ship-loading rate: 3000 tons per hour. 
Wisconsin: La Crosse - "La Crosse" 
Flour Milling: Burrus Mills, Inc. (Dallas, Texas) - formerly a 
subsidiary of Eltra Corp . (N.Y . ) Market area - Texas 
Facilities - Flour Mill (Ft. Worth, Texas) 
Terminal Grain Elevator ( Arnarilla, Texas) 
Erwin Bag Co. (Houston, Texas) 
Grain Eelvator and Wheat Processing Plant (Dallas, 
Texas) 
Resin Plants: Produces oil from polyesters, silicons and amino 
resins, unsaturated polyesters, water soluble systems and an 
aliphatic type of pre-pollymer urethanes. 
Philadephia, Penn.: $3 , 000 ,000 plant under con st ruction. 
Carpentersville, Ill. 
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CARGILL SHIPPING FACILITIES 
Cargill Peruana SA, Lima, Peru. (Fishmeal fleet) 
~ Gr oss Tonnage 
Don Gamboa fishing 105 
Calepa III fishing 105 
Calepa IV fishing 105 
Calepa v fishing 105 
Cale pa VI fishing 105 
Victoria Marine Company - Amsterdam, Holland 
Captain W.D . 
Cargill 
Car chester 
Carl antic 
merchant 
merchant 
merchant 
Car gill, Inc. DE, Franklin, Louisiana 
35,303 
9,074 
38,000 
Built 
1966 
1966 
1967 
1969 
1969 
1967 
1967 
1970 
~ Gross Tonnage Built 
pasenger 28 Car Isle 
Car Mine passenger 41 (U . S . registered) 
Cargill Carriers , Inc . , Wilmington, Delaware 
Type Gross Tonnage 
Austen S . 
Cargill towing 1,008 
Carweld miscellaneous 20 
Carweld II towing 21 
John H. 
MacMillan , J r. freight 1,065 
44 barges with total tonnage of 38,391 g ross tons : 
10 barges 840 
8 barges 860 
6 barges 886 
15 barges 887 
5 bar ges 898 
Built 
1960 
1957 
1958 
1964 
1960 
1963 
1960 
1960 
1958 
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CONTINENTAL 
ELEVATORS 
California 
Continental Elevator - French Camp 
Continental Elevator - Lemoore 
Continental Elevator - Saco Siding (P.O . Bakersfield) 
Illinois 
Iowa 
Continental Elevator "C" - Chicago 
Continental Elevators - Chicago 
Continental Elevator - East St. Louis 
Continental Elevator - Gilman 
Continental Elevator - Cushing 
Continental Elevator - Walnut 
Kansas 
Continental Elevator - Hut chison 
Continental Elevator - Morrowville 
Louisiana 
Continental Grain Elevator - Westwego (P.O. New Orleans) 
Minnesota 
The Continental Elevator - Minneapolis 
Port Continental Elevator - Savage 
Nebraska 
Continental Elevator - Brownville 
Continental Elevator - Cornlea 
Continental Elevator - Shelton 
New York 
Continental Concrete Central Elevator - Buffalo 4,500,000 bu. 
Ohio 
Continental Elevator - Columbus 
Oklahoma 
Continental Elevator - Enid 
Pennsylvania 
Continental Erie Elevator - Erie 
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Tennessee 
Continental Memphis Elevator - Memphis 
Texas 
Continental Elevator - Capps Switch (P.O. Sunray) 
Continental Elevator - F.tter (P.O. Dumas) 
Continental Elevator - Gruver 
Continental Elevator - Saginaw 
Continental Elevator - Sunray 
Virginia 
N & W Grain Elevator - Norfolk 
Wisconsin 
Continental Elevator - Superior 
FACILITIES 
Feed plants: Lancaster, Pennsylvania - 80,000 tons annually; Sherman, 
Texas; Franklinton, Louisiana; Elwood, Kansas. 
Poultry products plant and feed mill: Danville, Arkansas, 100,000 
tons per year . 
Flour mill, feed plant: Curacao, Netherland Antilles-part owned. 
Wayne Feed plants: Guntersville, Alabama; Troy, Alabama; Gainesville, 
Georgia; Iowa City and Mason City, Iowa; East St. Louis, Illinois; 
Fort Wayne, Indiana; Omaha, Nebraska; Buffalo, New York; Everson, 
Pennsylvania; Memphis, Tennessee; Fort Worth, Texas; Portsmouth, Virginia; 
Gainesville, Wisconsin. 
Wayne alfalfa dehydration plants: Cozad, Nebraska; Darra and 
Elm Creek, Nebraska 
144 
Wayne poultry products plants: Union Springs and Albertville, 
Alabama; Pendergrass and Clermont, Georgia; Fort Recovery and Postville, 
Iowa ( turkey processing); Archibold, Ohio; Laurel, Mississippi . 
Wayne Feed Division 
4000 dealerships in 37 states 
23 feed manufacturing plants include: 
Selma, N. C. 
Mendota, Illinois 
Bushnel l, Illinois 
Castleton, Indiana 
Lancaster, Penn. 
Iowa City, ~owa 
Elwood, Kansas 
Worthington, Minn. 
Mason City, Iowa 
Omaha, Nebraska 
Ft . Worth, Texas 
Alexander, New York 
Sangerfield, New York 
Cordele, Georgia 
4 pet-food manufacturing plants: 
Peoria, Illinois 
Everson, Penn. 
North Platte, Nebraska (Central Nebraska Packing Co.) 
Sebring, Ohio 
DIVISIONS, AFFILIATES, SUBSIDIARIES 
Allied Mills - 75% owned by Cont inental Grain . Allied Mills is 
engaged in integrated poultry operations, soybean and alfalfa processing, 
and the manufacture of livestock and poultry feed and pet food. Its 
subsidiaries and divisions include: 
Poultry Products Division 
Wayne Animal Health Aids 
Soybean and Alfalfa Division 
A gilt (hog) leasing program 
Raronet Corporation - a wholly owned leather-goods subsidiary 
Polo Food Products - a quick-foods business 
ContiCommodity Services A futures brokerage division formed in 
April, 1970. 
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Or owea t - A Ca li fornia baking andd milling conc e r n. 
Stellar Cha r tering & Broker age , Inc. - A wholly owned subsidiary 
formed in 1968 with t he acquisition of Mack Klosty and Compan y . 
Continental Grain Sales Corp. 
U. S . Grains Division - Handling grain ac tivit ies in the United States 
and Canada. 
Commodities Division - Headquarterred in New Yo rk. 
Far Eastern Division 
Overseas Shipholding Gr oup - The Fribourg family owns 14.3 percent 
interest, valued at abou t $17 .5 mil lion. 
Cie . Continental d'Importation - Ope r ating in Be l g ium and Paris. 
Continental Limited ( London) - Affiliat e that began in 1947 and 
includes William H. Pim Junr & Co ., and acquisition . 
Cont iCon sult (New York ) - Provides consulting serv i ces fo r Continental 
Grain affilia t es and divisions as well as outside o r ganizations. 
International Merchandising Center - Opera t ing in Wes t e rn Eur ope . 
Continental Gr a in of Canada 
Agricom - An Argentine food distributorship. 
Cont i nenta l Milling Corpora tion - Operates flour and feed mills in 
developing countries . 
- Na tional Milling Compan y of Guyana - 100 percent own ed . 
- Guayaqu i l, Ecuad o r - Continental , in a jo int ventur e with Seaboard 
Allied Milling Cor poration, o pe rates a f l our mill , a t extile bag 
manu facturing plant, and shipping faciliti es. 
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- Trujillo, Peru - Continental opera t es flour mill with t o tal capacit y 
of 4,600 c wt dai l y , including a durum milling un i t with capacity of 2 , 000 
cwt daily. 
- And flour milling facili ties 1n Curacao , Netherland Antilles and 
Guadeloupe, West Indies. 
BUNGE CORPORATION 
DIVISIONS, AFFILIATES, St!BSIDIARIES 
Bunge & Born - Buenos Aires , Arg entina 
Koninklijke Bunge ( NV) - Opera t es Europort, an area g ra in t e rminal 1n 
Rotterdam, Netherland s harbor . 
First American Farms - Producing soybeans 1n Walton County, Florida. 
Bunge of Canada Limit ed 
Gano Grain Division 
Galveston Elevator Company , Inc. 
Mikco Grain Company 
Hall e t & Carey Division 
P. R. Markley Division 
River Grain Division 
FAC ILITIES 
Port terminals - Four, including Destvehan, Louisiana, Galveston , 
Texas, and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. 
Rive r and rail termi nals - 27 including Bunge Corpo r a t ion , Albany 
Grain Terminal, Albany, I l linois; Mikco Grain Company Elevator , Cairo , 
Illinoi s; Bunge Cor poration Eas t Hannibal Grain Terminal, East Hannibal , 
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Illinois; Bunge Corporation Shawnee town Grain Terminal , Old Shawneetown, 
Illinois; Kansas City, Kansas; Livermore Grain Terminal , Livermore, 
Kentucky; Port Bunge, Savage, Minnesota; Katy Elevator, Fort Worth, Texas; 
Galveston "B" Elevator, Galveston, Texas. 
Soybean processing plant - Destrehan, Louisiana with processing 
capacity of 1,000 tons per day. Site included an export elevator with 
8,000,000 bushel capacity , which was destroyed by an explosion 1n 1971. 
Farmland - First American Farms, Walton County, Florida, 
Elevators - Bunge of Canada Ltd. in 1967 leased an 8 million bushel 
grain elevator terminal at Quebec City, Quebec . 
LOUIS DREYFUS CORPORATION 
ELEVATORS 
Port Cartier Elevator (Quebec) - Unloading speed of 70,000 - 80,000 
bushels an hour; loading speed of 100,000 bushels an hour; storage capacity 
of 10,460,000 bushels. 
Pascagoula, Mississippi; Portland, Oregon; Baltimore, Maryland; 
Minneapolis, Minnesota; and Windust, Washington. 
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SHIPPING INTERESTS 
Buries Marks LTD - City Gate House, Finsburg Square, London, England. 
~ Tons Built 
La Chacra merchant 16,599 1963 
La Colina merchant 7,216 1958 
La Estancia merchant 28,007 1965 
La Hacienda merchant 800 
La Loma merchant 10,251 1959 
La Sierra merchant 28,004 1966 
(Flower Line Ltd.) 
La Primavera merchant 6,935 1960 
(Louis Dreyfus & Co. Ltd.) 
La Marea merchant 10,112 1958 
Louis- Dreyfus & Cie - Paris, France; City Gate House, Finsburg Square, 
London, England. 
Type Tons Built 
Alain LD merchant 12,705 1969 
Charles LD merchant 21,560 1962 
Francois LD merchant 16,516 1962 
Gerard LD merchant 21,536 1963 
Jean LD merchant 7, 106 1957 
Leopold LD merchant 63,818 1970 
Louis LD merchant 7,109 1957 
Pierre LD merchant 21,536 1962 
Robert LD merchant 12,705 1969 
Phillippe LD merchant 6,733 1958 
Source for the Appendix . Hamilton 1972. 
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